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Introduction
Patents, as "discrete, national instruments," are of increasingly limited
value in a contemporary global economy that transcends national borders. 2
Patent law, 3 like all intellectual property law, has historically been based
on national laws and the principle of territoriality. 4 Individual national
governments grant patents to inventors, and the territorial limits of sovereignty preclude a nation from giving extraterritorial effect to its patent
laws. 5 Therefore, the rights, privileges, and obligations that accompany a
patent "begin and end with the country that issues it." 6 A U.S. patent, for
example, provides no protection against infringing activity in any country
7
other than the United States.
The ease of the international flow of goods, services, and information
in today's global society often makes patent rights in a single country
insufficient to protect new technology, forcing innovators to procure patents internationally on a nation-by-nation basis.8 Although international
agreements, including the Paris Convention, 9 the Patent Cooperation
2. Id. at 278.
3. A patent is a statutory right that a national government grants "to an inventor or
the inventor's assignee ... to exclude other people from practicing the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent specification ... for a fixed period of years." Gretchen
Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. the European Union,
40 IDEA 49, 51 (2000). The patent owner generally has "the exclusive right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention." Id. The most important
part of a patent is the claims, which set forth the metes and bounds of the patentee's
right to exclude. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 90 (3d ed. 2004).
4. Bender, supra note 3, at 49, 52.
5. Id.
6. Id.(quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Sperry Prod., Inc., 285 F.2d 911, 925 (6th
Cir. 1960)).
7. Id.
8. Brief for Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of the Appellee at 1, Voda v.
Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1238) [hereinafter Professors'
Briefl; Thomas, supra note 1, at 278.
9. The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, also
known as the Paris Convention, is the foundational patent harmonization treaty.
Bender, supra note 3, at 53. Prior to 1884, when the Paris Convention became effective,
inventors had to submit patent applications simultaneously in every country in which
they desired protection; failure to do so could preclude patent protection in every country except that in which the inventor first filed the application. Id. The Paris Convention
established the fundamental principle of "right of priority," which entitles a patent
applicant of a member country to a twelve-month period after the initial patent application to apply for patents in other member countries. Id. at 54-55. This provides a great
practical advantage to applicants who desire multinational patent protection because it
allows the applicant time to evaluate the economic viability of the invention before deciding on specific countries in which to seek patent protection. Id. at 55. The United
States is a party to the Paris Convention. Voda, 476 F.3d at 898.
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Treaty (PCT), 10 and the European Patent Convention (EPC), 11 have helped
streamline the acquisition of foreign patents, 12 the "national nature of patents means that enforcement remains local." 13 Thus, although foreign patents increasingly resemble each other, the continued legal independence
and territorial limitations of patents force patent holders to litigate simultaneously in several different countries.1 4 Such piecemeal international litigation leads to delay, contradictory results, and expense for both national
court systems and the parties to the litigation and, thus, uncertainty, delay,
and frustration.I 5 The burdens on both patentees and national court sys10: The Washington Treaty of 1970, commonly referred to as the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), simplifies the international patent application process by providing a
mechanism for filing one patent application that can have effect in many countries.
Bender, supra note 3, at 56. To begin, an applicant first files a PCT application in a
designated national patent office. Id. The international search authority conducts a
novelty examination and completes an international search report, which "expresses no
opinion as to the patentability of the invention but does include the classification of the
claimed invention, the technical fields searched and citations to the prior art." Id. Next,
in the national stage, the applicant submits the PCT application to national patent
offices where patent examiners examine the application based on their own national
patent laws. Id. Thus, although the PCT facilitates the task of obtaining patents in
multiple countries, it does not alter member states' substantive requirements of patentability. Id. at 56-57. The United States became a party to the PCT onJanuary 24, 1978.
See Voda, 476 F.3d at 899.
11. The Munich Convention on the Grant of European Patents, also known as the
European Patent Convention (EPC), which was signed on October 5, 1973 and became
effective on October 7, 1977, is an agreement between European states that established a
common European patent granting system with a common patent office, the European
Patent Office (EPO). Vincenzo Di Cataldo, From the European Patent to a Community
Patent, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19, 19 (2002); Jean-Luc Piotraut, European National IP Laws
Under the EU Umbrella:.From National to European Community IP Law, 2 Loy. U. CHI.
INT'L L. REV. 61, 63 (2005). The patent applicant submits a single application to the EPO
and if accepted, the EPO grants a European patent, which is actually a bundle of multiple national patents for the nations designated in the patent application. Bender, supra
note 3, at 58; Di Cataldo, supra, at 20.
12. Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 1.
13. Id.; Michael C. Elmer & Alejandro I. Garcia, Are U.S. Courts Going Global on
Voda v. Cordis?, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. (ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2006, at 4, 4. The 1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) agreement, to which the United States is a party, provides that member states
must provide for effective enforcement of intellectual property rights within their own
state, but the agreement does not require member states to provide for consolidation of
patent claims arising out of connected instances of infringement, to enforce the judgments of other members, or to exercise claim or issue preclusion based on trials in other
member states. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the Intellectual Property Bar:
The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421, 423-24 (2001).
14. Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 1; Thomas, supra note 1, at 278; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4; seeJudge Randall Rader, United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, Keynote Address at the High Technology Protection Summit at the University of Washington School of Law: Do you Want Your Foreign Patent Enforced in a
U.S. Court? 3-4 (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/
Symposium/Number6/Rader.pdf (explaining, through example, the difficulties facing
inventors currently attempting to enforce patents internationally).
15. Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 1; EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, AsSESSMENT OF THE
IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION AGREEMENT (EPLA) ON LITIGATION OF EUROPEAN PATENTS 1-4 (2006), www.european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/impact_assessment_2006_02_vl.pdf; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4.
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tems have led to a desire for multinational patent enforcement, which
entails consolidating suits regarding patent rights from different countries
in a single forum.

16

The potential for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign patent claims initially appears attractive as a means to prevent the debilitating
expense and delay of piecemeal patent litigation in individual national
courts. 1 7 As a result, the conservative approach of U.S. courts to multina-

tional patent enforcement has been highly criticized, especially given the
willingness of many European courts to adjudicate foreign patent claims. 18
In Voda v. Cordis Corp., Judge Leonard of the Western District of
Oklahoma, defying the traditional reluctance of U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims, permitted Dr. Jan K. Voda, a U.S.
cardiologist, 19 to allege infringement of his five Canadian and European
patents in addition to his three U.S. patents already in suit against Cordis
Corporation, a U.S. company. 20 Because of the significance of the issue
and the likelihood of substantial difference in opinion on the minimal relevant case law, 21 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted a
rare interlocutory appeal. 22 In the long-awaited decision handed down on
February 1, 2007, the Federal Circuit found that the Oklahoma district
court abused its discretion in assuming jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign
patent infringement claims,2 3 reasserting the traditional hesitance of U.S.
courts to assume jurisdiction over foreign patent claims. With a particular
emphasis on comity concerns, the decision all but eliminates the potential
for U.S. 4courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent
2
claims.
While the immediate future of multinational patent litigation in U.S.
courts was pending in the Federal Circuit, 25 the European Court of Justice
16. Bender, supra note 3, at 53; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4; Rader, supra
note 14, at 3.
17. See Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 1-3.
18. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 505, 577 (1997); Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territorialityin Intellectual Property: Lessons From Patent Law, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 603,
610 (1997); Thomas, supra note 1, at 279-80, 346, 352; Harold C. Wegner, Voda v.
Cordis: Trans-Border Patent Enforcement 3, 12-15 (Nov. 17, 2005) (unpublished paper),
available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s3lPublications/FileUploadl37/2989/
Voda TexasPaper.pdf.
19. Brief for Appellee at 3, Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No.
05-1238) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)).
20. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L (W.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2004) (order
granting plaintiffs motion to amend complaint) [hereinafter Order Granting
Amendment].
21. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. MISC. 785 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2005) (order granting appeal) [hereinafter Order Granting Appeal].
22. See Wegner, supra note 18, at 33.
23. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 887.
24. Toshiko Takenaka, High Hurdle for U.S. Courts to Hear Foreign Infringement
Claims, CASRIP NEWSL. (Ctr. for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop., Seattle, Wash.), Spring 2007.
25. See Wegner, supra note 18, at 31 ("Judge Leonard's August 2, 2004[ ] trial court
order granted supplemental jurisdiction to hear foreign patent infringement claims; it
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(ECJ) largely crushed the European multinational patent enforcement
27
trend 26 with two July 13, 2006 decisions in Roche Nederland v. Primus
and Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG (GAT). 28 As a result, Europe immediately began
a "concerted push" for both the Community Patent and the European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA), two initiatives to improve the European
patent litigation system that have been in negotiations for years. 29 These
recent European developments suggest the wisdom of U.S. courts' general
refusal to assert jurisdiction over foreign patent claims. The ECJ decisions
illustrate the lingering territoriality of patent law 30 despite the cooperative
legal environment fostered by the European Union (EU) 3 1 and the concomitant success in harmonizing European national patent laws. 32 In addition
to the two decisions, 33 the proposed judicial systems in the Community
Patent initiative and the EPLA demonstrate European nations' continued
hesitance to allow foreign national courts to adjudicate patents effective in
their territory. 34 Furthermore, the unavoidable inefficiencies evident in
previous multinational patent enforcement efforts in European national
courts, 3 5 despite being better suited for multinational patent enforcement

than U.S. courts, 3 6 establish that national courts are not an ideal venue for
patent enforcement on an international level. As such, the recent impetus
for both the Community Patent and the EPLA suggests that Europe has
realized that multinational agreements establishing a common patent judicial system are the appropriate means to ensure effective multinational patent litigation. 3 7 Although multinational patent enforcement is a
praiseworthy goal, the lessons from Europe illustrate that it is a goal that
38
the United States generally should not pursue on its own.
will in hindsight be seen as either the most significant trial court order for the globalization of patent rights in some time or the forerunner for later judicial, treaty, or legislati[ve] action that will confirm District Judge Tim Leonard's bold globalization of
patent law.").
26. Beth Z. Shaw, Court Rules Against Cross-BorderEnforcement of "European" Patent
Rights, LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash. D.C.), Oct. 6, 2006, at 1, 1-2,

available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/100606shaw.pdf.
27. Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535.
28. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509.
29. See Charlie McGreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt. & Servs., IPR- Next
Steps (Sept. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Next Steps].
30. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
31. See Bender, supra note 3, at 49.
32. See id.; Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19.
33. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
34. See generally EUROPEAN PATENT

OFFICE,

supra note 15, at 5 (describing the pro-

posed judicial system in the draft EPLA); Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 27 (explaining
the difficulties in negotiating a judicial system for the proposed Community Patent).
35. See Reinhardt Schuster, Divide and Conquer, MANAGING INTELL.

PROP.,

Oct. 2006.

36. See Koos Rasser, United Kingdom: ExtraterritorialReach of US Patent Law,
MONDAQ
Bus. BRIEFING,
Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid-38098.
37. See Next Steps, supra note 29.
38. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[W]e as the U.S.
judiciary should not unilaterally decide either for our government or for other foreign
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After explaining general concepts of jurisdiction in U.S. courts applicable to foreign patent claims (Part I.A.1), this Note examines U.S. courts'
traditional hesitance to exercise such jurisdiction (Part I.A.2) and then
introduces the controversial Federal Circuit decision in Voda v. Cordis
Corp., which perpetuates this conservative approach to multinational patent enforcement (Part I.B). For comparison, the Note turns to a discussion
of recent European developments in multinational patent litigation, specifically Dutch courts' progressive use of multinational patent injunctions
(Part Il.A), followed by the ECJ's decisions in Roche and GAT, which
severely limit the potential for such consolidated suits (Part IL.B). Next, the
Note describes specific initiatives to harmonize the European patent litigation system, the Community Patent (Part II.C) and the EPLA (Part I.D),
along with European leaders' current plan for the implementation of both
initiatives (Part II.E).
Finally, the Note explores the lessons that Europe's example provides
the United States. The Note argues that, despite progress in unifying the
European patent system, European nations remain hesitant to accept a foreign national court's patent invalidity determinations, which the ECJ decisions in Roche and GAT, as well as the proposed judicial systems in the
Community Patent and the EPLA, evidence. This hesitance reinforces comity concerns, which have been the main barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign patent claims in U.S. courts (Part IILA). Further, the rare
availability of multinational patent enforcement, combined with the inherent difficulties of its use, confirm that national courts are not an ideal
venue for the global enforcement of patent rights (Part III.B). As such, the
Note concludes that Europe's initiatives demonstrate that agreements specifically designed to implement a common patent judicial system, although
difficult to establish, are the best means to effectuate multinational patent
enforcement (Part III.C).
I.

The United States

A.

The Conservative Attitude of U.S. Courts Toward Multinational
Patent Enforcement

1.

Concepts of Jurisdiction in U.S. Courts Relevant to Foreign Patent
Claims

In order for a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over foreign patent
claims, the court must consider: (1) whether the court has jurisdiction over
the claims, and (2) whether the court, in its discretion, should decline to
exercise jurisdiction over the claims. 3 9 Under the first prong of the jurisdiction analysis, for a U.S. court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign patent claim, the court must have both personal jurisdiction and subject
sovereigns that our courts will become the adjudicating body for any foreign patent with
a [sufficiendy related] U.S. equivalent ....); EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at
8-9.
39. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 14, at 5.
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matter jurisdiction. 40 In the patent context, the requirements for personal
jurisdiction, the judicial power to bind the parties, usually do not present
met if the defendant purposefully
much of a barrier and are ordinarily
4
.1
forum.
the
in
activity
conducts
There are two possible avenues for a U.S. court to assume subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign patent: diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. 4 2 Diversity jurisdiction exists if the requirements of
43
litigant diversity and amount in controversy (currently $75,000) are met.
Although the amount in controversy in most patent infringement cases typically exceeds the $75,000 requirement, 44 satisfying the litigant diversity
requirement is more problematic. 45 First, domestic diversity must be complete: the parties must be citizens of different states. 46 Additionally, diver47
sity jurisdiction may fail if aliens litigate on both sides of the proceeding.
Nevertheless, a U.S. court will often have jurisdiction over foreign patent
48
claims based on diversity jurisdiction.
Given that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) gives federal district courts original
jurisdiction over claims involving U.S. patents, 4 9 federal courts may also
rely on supplemental jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction over foreign patent claims that are sufficiently related to U.S. patent claims. 50 The U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the fundamental principles of pendent jurisdiction, the predecessor to supplemental jurisdiction,5 1 in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs.52 The Court explained that supplemental
40. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 578-79; Thomas, supra note 1, at 312-14.
41. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 578-79 & n.364; Thomas, supra note 1, at 314-15.
42. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 5. Theoretically, U.S. federal courts can
assume jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims based on patent jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), unfair competition jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, but case law only supports supplemental jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction as a means of assuming jurisdiction. See id. at 5 & n.7.
43. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6. Section 1332(a) provides in relevant part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
is between- (1) citizens of different States; .. .[and ]( 3) citizens of different States and
in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties .... For the pur-

poses of this section .... an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence
shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
44. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant at 8,
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1238) [hereinafter U.S.
Brief].
45. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
46. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 312; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
47. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
48. See U.S. Brief, supra note 44, at 6.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... Such

jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ...cases."); see
Thomas, supra note 1, at 312.
50. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 579.
51. Thomas, supra note 1, at 318-19.
52. See 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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jurisdiction exists if the non-federal claim arose out of a "common nucleus
of operative fact" with a claim within the original jurisdiction of the federal
court and, as such, the claims would ordinarily be expected to be tried in
one proceeding. 5 3 In 1990, Congress codified the basic principles articulated in Gibbs regarding the scope and exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 5 4 Section 1367(a) states in relevant part:
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the5 5same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.
Once a court determines that it has jurisdiction, the second prong of
the jurisdiction analysis presents the separate question of whether the
court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction. 5 6 Thus, even if the
requirements for personal and subject matter jurisdiction are met, a U.S.
court may nonetheless decline to exercise that jurisdiction under certain
prudential doctrines, 5 7 including the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
considerations of international comity, and the act of state doctrine. 58 For
supplemental jurisdiction suits, § 1367(c) provides specific bases to
59
decline to entertain supplemental claims.
The forum non conveniens doctrine, a likely obstacle to the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims predicated on either diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction, allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction
if it would be an inconvenient forum and an adequate alternative forum
exists. 60 To obtain a forum non conveniens dismissal, the defendant must
show that there is an adequate alternative forum and that various private
and public interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 6 1 The relevant private interest factors, which relate to the convenience of litigants, include:
(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2) the availability of
compulsory process for attendance of the unwilling, (3) the cost of the
attendance of the parties and witnesses, (4) if necessary, the possibility of
viewing the premises, (5) the enforceability of the judgment, and (6)
whether the plaintiff sought to harass the defendant in choosing the
53. Id. at 725; see Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux (Mars II), 24 F.3d
1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725); Thomas, supra note 1, at
312-13.
54. Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1374. Although the wording of the statute is slightly different
from the Gibbs test, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory relatedness requirement of § 1367(a) as Congress's codification of the "common nucleus of operative fact"
test of Gibbs. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 894 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Chicago
v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997); see Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1374.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
56. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 5.
57. Thomas, supra note 1, at 315.
58. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
59. U.S. Brief, supra note 44, at 9; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
60. See U.S. Brief, supra note 44, at 14; Thomas, supra note 1, at 315.
61. Bradley, supra note 18, at 579-80.
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forum. 6 2 The relevant public interest factors, which relate to the conve-

nience of the forum, include: (1) the burden placed on congested courts
that lack a connection to the litigation, (2) the burden placed on jurors in a
community unrelated to the litigation, and (3) local interest in having con63
troversies decided at home.
The act of state doctrine provides another means by which U.S. courts
can abstain from exercising jurisdiction over foreign patent claims. 6 4 The
doctrine essentially prohibits courts from reviewing the validity of public
acts of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory. 6 5 For patents, the rationale for the doctrine is that only a court or the patent office
in the country that granted the patent should have jurisdiction to invalidate
it. 66 In a foreign patent case, therefore, a dismissal based on the act of state
doctrine has two requirements: (1) a foreign country issued a patent
wherein the patent itself represents an "act of state," and (2) a U.S. court is
reviewing the validity of that patent. 6 7 Significantly, several U.S. courts
have held that the doctrine is inapplicable to actions involving foreign patents, reasoning that the grant of a patent is a purely ministerial activity,
68
which does not meet the first requirement of the doctrine.
Concerns of international comity may also preclude the consolidation
of foreign patent claims in U.S. courts. 6 9 Comity refers to the "spirit of

cooperation" in which a domestic court approaches the resolution of cases
involving the laws and interests of a foreign sovereign. 70 Although the precise meaning of the concept remains unclear, the Supreme Court defined
comity in Hilton v. Guyot as "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws."'7 1 In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States District Court, the Supreme Court added an additional consideration to guide the comity analysis, advising courts to consider
whether exercising jurisdiction would prejudice the rights of the foreign
62. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947); Elmer & Garcia,
supra note 13, at n.32.
63. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at n.33.
64. Thomas, supra note 1, at 315.
65. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 405
(1990); Bradley, supra note 18, at 581.
66. Mariano Municoy, Allocation of Jurisdiction on Patent Disputes in the Models
Developed by the Hague Conference in Private International Law: Asymmetric Countries
and the Relationship of Private Parties, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 342, 370 (2005).
67. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
68. Bradley, supra note 18, at 581; see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1292-94 (3d Cir. 1979); Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516
F. Supp. 1210, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
69. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
70. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987)).
71. 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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government. 72 Because invalidating a foreign patent constitutes disrespect
toward another sovereign, 73 considerations of comity are most acute when,
as is usually the case in patent infringement cases, the court must determine the validity of a patent as a result of an invalidity defense. 74 Notions
of comity have presented a substantial bar to foreign patent consolidation
5
7
in U.S. case law.

Specific to supplemental jurisdiction, a court also has considerable
discretion to decline jurisdiction over a non-federal claim under
§ 1367(c).

76

The discretionary factors outlined in §1367(c) are, to a con-

siderable extent, a restatement of the factors in a forum non conveniens
analysis 7 7 and require the district court to consider judicial economy, convenience, fairness to litigants, and comity. 78 Section 1367(c)(1) allows the

court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the claim "raises a
novel or complex issue of State law. ''79 Patent claims, however, do not necessarily raise especially novel or complex issues under the laws of the issuing country, decreasing the likelihood that § 1367(c)(1) will be applicable
to foreign patent cases in U.S. courts.80 Additionally, § 1367(c)(2) gives
the court discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "if the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction."8' Furthermore, § 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "in excep72. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 900 (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale,482
U.S. at 543 n.27).
73. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6.
74. U.S. Brief, supra note 44, at 12.
75. See infra Parts I.A.ii,
L.B for a discussion of the relevant case law: Voda, 476 F.3d
887; Mars II, 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Goldberg v. Cordis Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. 717
(N.D. 111.1976), aff'd, 567 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977); Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. 111.1972).
76. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 7; see Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 433. Section
1367(c) was intended to codify the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction that
the Supreme Court emphasized in Gibbs. U.S. Brief, supra note 44, at 4-5. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) provides:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if-(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of
State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
77. U.S. Brief, supra note 44, at 14.
78. See Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997); Brief for
Defendant-Appellant at 51, Voda, 476 F.3d 887 (No. 05-1238); U.S. Brief, supra note 44,
at 10.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)( 1) (2000).
80. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 7. In Mars, the district court found that the
foreign patent claim involved novel and complex issues of Japanese law. Mars Inc. v.
Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux (Mars 1), 825 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Del. 1993), aff'd, 24
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Mars' claim of infringement of a Japanese patent .. .
raise[s] novel and complex issues of Japanese law. For example[,] the parties disagree as
to the extent to which Japanese law allows discovery, and the Court anticipates disagreements among the parties as to the substance of Japanese patent law.").
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)( 2) (2000).
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tional circumstances" in which "there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.

2.

8 2

Multinational Patent Enforcement in U.S. Courts

American courts have historically been reluctant to adjudicate claims
83
based on foreign intellectual property law, particularly patent law.
Despite the practical advantages to the patentee, 84 suits claiming infringement of foreign patents in U.S. courts have been relatively rare, suggesting
that the general reluctance to assume such jurisdiction has led practition85
ers to believe that it would be futile to seek it.
In Ortman v. Stanray, the first case in which a U.S. court addressed the
possibility of pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction over foreign patent
87
claims,8 6 the district court exercised jurisdiction over the foreign claims.
This is a rarity in U.S. courts, as subsequent case law demonstrates. 88 The
plaintiff, an Illinois resident, sued a Delaware corporation alleging infringement of a U.S. patent, as well as "equivalent" Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican patents, which were all the basis of a contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant.8 9 The Seventh Circuit noted that, because the district
court had jurisdiction over the alleged infringement of the U.S. patent
under § 1338(a), the issue was whether the district court had pendent
jurisdiction over the foreign patent infringement claims. 90 The court
explained that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, it would seem clear that
plaintiff could not come into a United States District Court and sue for
infringement of patents issued by Canada, Brazil and Mexico where such
claim is based upon alleged acts of the defendant in each of the foreign
countries named." 9 1 Nevertheless, stating that all of the defendant's allegedly infringing domestic and foreign acts were similar, the court held that
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction could apply depending on the district
court's interpretation of the contract between the parties. 9 2 On remand,
the district court found that the Gibbs test for pendent jurisdiction was
satisfied because "charges arising from the sale and manufacture of the
same instrumentality in various countries clearly arise from a 'common
nucleus of operative fact."'93 Thus, both the Seventh Circuit and the dis82. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)( 4) (2000).
83. See Chisum, supra note 18, at 610.
84. See Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 1
85. See Chisum, supra note 18, at 610.
86. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 22.
87. Ortman v. Stanray (Ortman 1), 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967), remanded to, 163
U.S.P.Q. 331 (N.D. l11.1969), rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971).
88. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 318-22.
89. Ortman 1, 371 F.2d at 155-56.
90. Id. at 156-57.
91. Id. at 156.
92. Id. at 158.
93. Ortman v. Stanray (Ortman II), 163 U.S.P.Q. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971) (quoting United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Decided in 1967, the case came shortly after Gibbs
but before Congress enacted § 1367 in 1990. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 5.
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trict court were receptive to the resolution of foreign patent claims under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.9 4 However, the unique factual situation-the foreign patents were entangled in a contractual controversy
between two U.S. nationals in which there was minimal risk of offending
foreign nations-may limit the applicability of the court's holding to other
95
foreign patent infringement claims.
In contrast, other U.S. courts have either indicated or assumed that
they had authority to exercise jurisdiction over foreign patent claims but,
nonetheless, have declined to exercise such jurisdiction. 96 In a 1972 district court case, Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
another suit between two U.S. nationals, the plaintiff alleged infringement
97
of its U.S. patent and nine corresponding patents from foreign countries.
Seeking to dismiss the foreign patent claims, the defendant noted that it
would plead a defense of invalidity to all of the infringement claims. 98 The
court assumed that it could exercise jurisdiction over the foreign patent
claims on the basis of pendent jurisdiction or, alternatively, diversity jurisdiction, 99 but it declined to assert jurisdiction for several reasons.10 0 First,
the court's determination that a foreign patent, "an act of an agency of a
foreign government," is invalid would raise "serious questions of comity."''1 1 The court also noted that a foreign country's patent law is based
on economic and social principles best understood by the courts of the
granting nation. 10 2 The court further stated that:
[i]t is not unlikely that the courts in the foreign countries whose patents are
involved here would disagree with this court's determinations on the validity
of the patents. Those courts would at any rate be faced with the hard choice
of accepting the inexpert determination of a foreign court or creating an
unseemly conflict with the judgment of the court of another country. 103
Thus, the prospects for enforcement of the judgment by a foreign court
were uncertain. 10 4 Furthermore, translation difficulties would have inevitably arisen in dealing with the seven foreign languages necessary to adjudicate the foreign patents.' 0 5 Perhaps most importantly, the court was
unconvinced of the need to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign patent
94. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 319.
95. See Chisum, supra note 18, at 611.
96. Thomas, supra note 1, at 320.
97. 346 F. Supp. 408, 409 (N.D. I1. 1972).
98. Id.; see Chisum, supra note 18, at 611.
99. Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 408.
100. Chisum, supra note 18, at 611; Thomas, supra note 1, at 320.
101. Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 410.
102. Id. at 410-11; see Chisum, supra note 18, at 612; Thomas, supra note 1, at 320.
103. Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 410.
104. See id.; Thomas, supra note 1, at 320.
105. See Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 411 ("Not only would this court be dependent upon
legal opinions, undoubtedly conflicting, of experts in the laws of the foreign countries
involved; the court would also be required to rely upon translations of those opinions
and of the patents, statutes, regulations and court and administrative decisions on
which the expert opinions are based. The risks of distortion of meaning in translation
are apparent.").
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claims "in order to give the plaintiff the relief to which it was entitled. '10 6
Because the defendant only manufactured the accused devices in the
United States, enforcement of the U.S. patent alone would allow the plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief and recover damages for each infringing
device. 107
Additionally, in the 1976 case Goldberg v. Cordis Corp., a district court
declined to exercise jurisdiction over claims of infringement of Canadian
and British patents on the basis of comity.' 0 8 The court explained that
"the validity of foreign patents would necessarily be in issue" in a foreign
patent infringement claim. 10 9 Furthermore, determining the validity of
foreign patents "would invite conflict with the administrative and judicial
officers of those governments" and, thus, the power to adjudicate such conflicts should be exercised "with great reluctance."' 110
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has displayed a conservative approach to
the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims."' In
Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, decided in 1994, the Federal
Circuit held that a district court did not have supplemental jurisdiction
over an infringement claim based on a Japanese patent. 1 2 The plaintiff, a
U.S. national, filed an action in the Delaware district court against Nippon
Conlux, a Japanese company, and Conlux U.S.A. Corporation, its U.S. sub113
sidiary, for infringement of both a U.S. and a parallel Japanese patent.
The district court "assumed, without deciding, that it had authority under
section 1367(a)" to hear the Japanese patent infringement claim but
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction based on international comity and a § 1367(c) discretionary analysis. 1 14 Under the § 1367(c) analysis, the court reasoned that the case involved novel and complex issues of
Japanese law and, therefore, the Japanese patent claims would substantially
predominate over the U.S. patent claims. 1 15 In regard to comity, the court
held that even if, as the plaintiff argued, Japanese law prevented the defendant from asserting invalidity as a defense to infringement so that the
court would not have to rule directly on the validity of the Japanese patent,
the claim still implicated the principles underlying comity because the
court must decide whether "a Japanese company is prohibited under Japanese law from making or selling its products in Japan." ' 1 6 Additionally,
the court noted that most courts that have considered the issue of whether
to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign patent infringement claim have
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
at 25.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.; Thomas, supra note 1, at 320.
See Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 411; Chisum, supra note 18, at 612.
203 U.S.P.Q. 717, 718 (N.D. 111.1976), aff'd, 567 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id.; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 25.
Goldberg, 203 U.S.P.Q. at 718; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78,
Thomas, supra note 1, at 280.
24 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1370.
Mars 1, 825 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Del. 1993); Thomas, supra note 1, at 321.
Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1374.
Mars 1, 825 F. Supp. at 76.
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1 17
refused to do so on account of comity concerns.

On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
erred in assuming that it had supplemental jurisdiction over the Japanese
patent claim under § 1367(a) because the U.S. and Japanese patents did'
not derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.1 18 The Federal Circuit distinguished Ortman, holding, 1 19 "[I]n contrast to Ortman, neither
'similar acts' nor the 'same instrumentality' are at issue" in the foreign patent claims. 120 In making this determination, the court noted four differences, now known as the "Mars factors," between: (1) the respective
patents, (2) the accused devices, (3) the allegedly infringing acts, and (4)
the governing laws. 12 1 First, the U.S. patent claims were method claims,
but the Japanese patent claim was an apparatus claim. 122 Second, the
range of accused devices in Japan was much broader than in the United
States. 123 Third, the allegedly infringing acts were different in that the
defendant was charged with direct and induced infringement of the U.S.
patent but only with direct infringement of the Japanese patent.' 2 4 Fourth,
the governing laws were different. 12 5 Commentators have argued that
because these differences do not appear particularly significant individu117. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Cordis Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. 717 (N.D. 111.1976), affid, 567
F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977); Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 408 (N.D. 111.1972)).
118. Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375-76.
119. As affirmed by the Federal Circuit in Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 895
(Fed. Cir. 2007), given the Mars court's deliberate attempt to distinguish the facts of
Ortman without questioning its holding, Mars does allow for the possibility of a foreign
patent claim sufficiently related to a U.S. patent claim to permit the existence of supplemental jurisdiction. See Medigene AG v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 98 C 2026, 2001
WL 1636916, at *1 (N.D. Il. Dec. 19, 2001); Fritz Blumer, Jurisdiction and Recognition
in Transatlantic Patent Litigation, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 329, 345 (2001); Gerald J.

Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 541
(1998); Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 5 & n.25; Wegner, supra note 18, at 28. But
see Berkshire Furniture Co., Inc. v. Glattstein, 921 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
120. Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375.
121. See id.; Chris Igielski, Voda v. Cordis and the New Score on Supplemental Jurisdiction over Foreign PatentClaims: Comity-1, Judicial Discretion-O,CASRIP NEWSL. (Ctr. for
Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop., Seattle, Wash.), Spring 2007.
122. Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 27.
A method claim is a patent claim that describes a method of making or using objects or
substances to achieve a useful result. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1161 (8th ed. 2004);
CHISUM ET AL..,supra note 3, at 92. A method claim patents the combination or sequence

of acts or steps, not the resulting product. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 93. In contrast, an apparatus claim is a patent claim on a mechanical device or structure, which
must recite the connection of the components and how they function together. See
BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY,

supra, at 1160; CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 93. The court

did not consider whether the distinction in the claim formats had a substantive effect on
the facts of the case. Thomas, supra note 1, at 323.
123. Mars II, 24 F.3d. at 1375; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 27.
The court, however, admitted that some of the accused devices in Japan may have been
similar to the U.S. device. Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375; Thomas, supra note 1, at 323-24.
124. Mars II, 24 F.3d. at 1375; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 27.
This difference is perhaps most puzzling given that the Japanese claim of direct infringement was a subset of the U.S. claim of direct and indirect infringement. Thomas, supra
note 1, at 324.
125. Mars II, 24 F.3d. at 1375.
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ally or even as a whole, 126 the Federal Circuit's position that the U.S. and
Japanese patent claims did not derive from a "common nucleus of opera127
tive fact" is "tenuous at best."'
Going further, in dicta, the court anticipated that the plaintiff would
replead jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. 1 28 The court noted
that such an attempt would be futile because the trial court already made
findings pertinent to a forum non conveniens analysis that supported dismissal, including translation issues, the difficulty of resolving complex
issues of Japanese procedural and substantive law, and that "general concerns respecting international comity counsel against exercising jurisdiction over a matter involving a Japanese patent, Japanese law, and acts of a
Japanese defendant in Japan."'1 2 9 This dicta confirms the Federal Circuit's
hostility toward foreign patent claims. 130 Certainly, with such a rigorous
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, a U.S. court would
rarely assume jurisdiction over a foreign patent claim.' 3' Although, as
dicta, its precedential effect may be limited,' 3 2 its "chilling effect" has
resulted in few attempts to seek multinational patent enforcement in U.S.
13 3

courts.

In subsequent cases involving foreign intellectual property claims, district courts have had opposing interpretations of Mars and its implications
for the availability of jurisdiction over foreign patent claims in U.S. courts.
Mars has sometimes been interpreted to stand for a broad per se rule that
U.S. courts never have supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent
claims. 13 4 In the 1995 case Berkshire FurnitureCo., Inc. v. Glattstein,13 5 for
example, a district court noted that in Mars, "the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that U.S. courts do not have ...supplemental jurisdiction to litigate foreign patents in the same action in which U.S. intellectual
properties are in issue."' 13 6 Nevertheless, in Medigene AG v. Loyola University of Chicago, another district court relied on § 1367 and Mars to find
supplemental jurisdiction over claims related to the inventorship of foreign
126. See supra note 122-124; Thomas, supra note 1, at 323-24.
127. Chisum, supra note 18, at 613.
128. Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375-76.
129. Id. at 1376.
130. See Chisum, supra note 18, at 613; Wegner, supra note 18, at 27.
131. Thomas, supra note 1, at 324.
132. Id.
133. Wegner, supra note 18, at 27.
134. See Berkshire Furniture Co., Inc. v. Glattstein, 921 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (W.D.
Ky. 1995).
135. Id. Berkshire did not involve patent claims; rather, the plaintiff asked the court
to adjudicate the validity of foreign design registrations. Id. at 1560.
136. Id. at 1561. Courts have also cited Mars for its recognition that "general concerns respecting international comity counsel against exercising jurisdiction over a matter involving a Japanese patent and the acts of a Japanese defendant in Japan," see S.
Megga Telecommunications Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 96-357-SLR, 1997 WL 86413
(D. Del. Feb. 14, 1997) (quoting Mars II, 24 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); Berkshire, 921 F. Supp at 1561 (quoting Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1376), which is a less controversial proposition given its recurrence in U.S. case law.
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patent applications. 1 3 7 In its motion to dismiss counts of the defendant's
counterclaim, the plaintiff relied on Mars for the proposition that disputes
about foreign patent applications are beyond the jurisdictional reach of
§ 1367(a). 13 8 The district court, however, disagreed and denied the
motion, ruling, "We do not read that case to support any such broad rule.
Rather, the discussion of the Court made clear that in appropriate circumstances Section 1367 permits exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim for infringement of a foreign patent."'139 The court held that, in contrast to the facts in Mars, the Medigene defendant's counterclaim alleged
that the foreign patent applications pertained to the same invention and
involved the same co-inventorship issue as the U.S. patent, 140 which warranted the existence of supplemental jurisdiction. 14 1 Certainly, the opposing interpretations of Mars regarding the availability of supplemental
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims in the United States required
4 2
clarification. 1
B.

Voda v. Cordis Corp.: The Federal Circuit Restricts Multinational
Patent Enforcement in U.S. Courts

1.

The Voda Decision

In Voda v. Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts to adjudicate foreign patent disputes pursuant to
supplemental jurisdiction. 143 In so doing, the court perpetuated the conservative approach of U.S. courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, to multinational patent enforcement, largely eliminating any hope for
14 4
multinational patent enforcement in U.S. courts.
On October 30, 2003, Dr. Voda, an Oklahoma cardiologist, filed an
action against Cordis Corporation, a Florida medical device corporation, 14 5 in the Western District of Oklahoma seeking damages for alleged
infringement of three U.S. patents protecting guiding catheters in angi137. See No. 98 C 2026, 2001 WL 1636916, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2001); Brief for
Appellee, supra note 19, at 24.
138. See Medigene, 2001 WL 1636916, at *1.
139. Id. (citing Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1374-75).
140. In a motion to dismiss, the court must assume the truth of the allegations. See
id.
141. Id. The court declined to consider the motion to dismiss on the basis of forum
non conveniens because, at the time, the court did not know enough about the foreign
patent claims to tell whether any of the problems anticipated by the defendant were
likely to arise. Id. at *2.
142. See Order Granting Appeal, supra note 21 (finding that the issue of the court's
supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign patents presents "a controlling question of
law to which there is a substantial difference of opinion .... ).
143. 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007); DarrylJ. Adams, Foreign Patent Disputes Are OffLimits for U.S. Courts, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST (Law Journal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.),

Apr. 2004.
144. See Adams, supra note 143.
145. Dr. Voda did not join any of the foreign Cordis affiliates, which the Federal Circuit believed to be separate legal entities. Voda, 476 F.3d at 890. All of the Cordis companies, both U.S. and foreign, are subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson. Id. at 890 n. 1.
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oplasty.146 During discovery, Dr. Voda learned that Cordis sold the allegedly infringing catheter in Canada and Europe. 1 4 7 On June 14, 2004, Dr.
Voda, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) gave the district court supplemental jurisdiction, 148 moved to amend his complaint to assert the infringement of his European, British, French, German, and Canadian foreign
patents. 14 9 Dr. Voda's foreign patents resulted from a common PCT application, which was an amended version of Dr. Voda's original U.S. patent
application.' 50 The three U.S. patents already at issue in the case resulted
from continuation applications 1 5 of this original U.S. patent application. 152 Dr. Voda admitted that there was some subject matter in the U.S.
patents already at issue that was not present in the foreign patents but
insisted that the claims of the U.S. patents and the foreign patents were
"substantially identical."'1 5 3
After considering both parties' briefs, the district court granted Dr.
Voda's motion to amend his complaint to add infringement claims based
on his foreign patents. 154 Although Cordis cited Mars for the proposition
that U.S. courts do not have supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent
infringement claims in a U.S. patent suit, the district court, like that in
Medigene,' 5 5 disagreed, holding that "Mars . . . does not support such a
broad rule."' 5 6 The district court pointed out that the Mars court distinguished that case from Ortman, in which all of the defendant's allegedly
146. See id. at 890-91; Order Granting Amendment, supra note 20; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 2; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4. Dr. Voda's three
U.S. patents at issue in the case were U.S. Patent No. 5,445,625; 6,083,213; and
6,475,195. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at xiii.
147. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 10; see Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra
note 78, at 12.
148. Dr. Voda did not assert any other statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
Voda, 476 F.3d at 893 n.5. Therefore, although the parties disputed on appeal whether
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 provided an alternative basis for jurisdiction over Dr.
Voda's foreign patent infringement claims, the Federal Circuit declined to decide
whether the district court could properly exercise jurisdiction based on diversity. Id. at
905.
149. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 10-11; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4.
The five foreign patents that Dr. Voda sought to include in his amended complaint are:
(1) European Patent No. 0 568 624, (2) German Patent No. DE 69 23 20 95, (3) British
Patent No. GB 568 624, (4) French Patent No. FR568624, and (5) Canadian Patent No.
CA 2,100,785. Voda, 476 F.3d at 890; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 2.
150. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 890; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 8.
151. A continuation application is an application that is filed while an earlier-filed
"parent" application is pending, which carries on the prosecution of some or all of the
original parent application. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 122, at 1159.
152. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 5-6; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra
note 78, at 5-10, for a detailed description of the patent prosecution history for each of
the patents at issue in Voda.
153. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 7.
154. Voda, 476 F.3d at 891; Order Granting Amendment, supra note 20; Brief for
Appellee, supra note 19, at 10-11.
155. See Medigene AG v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 98 C 2026, 2001 WL 1636916,
at *1 (N.D. 11. Dec. 19, 2001).
156. Order Granting Amendment, supra note 20.
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infringing domestic and foreign acts were similar. 15 7 Noting that "this case
is more akin to Ortman than to Mars," the district court found that it would
have supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign patent infringement
claims. 158

On August 27, 2004, Cordis moved for reconsideration or, alternatively, for the decision to be certified for appeal. 15 9 On January 7, 2005,
the district court denied reconsideration but granted Cordis's motion to
certify the order for interlocutory appeal, finding that:
the issue of its jurisdiction over the foreign patents presents a controlling
question of law on which a substantial ground for difference of opinion
exists and the resolution of which would materially advance the ultimate
resolution of this action. The court is loathe to put the parties to the
expense of litigating the foreign patents
if indeed it does not have subject
160
matter jurisdiction over those claims.
Cordis then petitioned for review on the issue of "whether the district
court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's five foreign patents." 1 6 1 "Because of the paucity of law surrounding this issue,"
the Federal Circuit granted Cordis's interlocutory appeal on February 22,
2005.162 The pending Federal Circuit decision in Voda sparked increased
debate about the availability of multinational patent enforcement in U.S.
courts, as evidenced by the five amici curiae briefs on behalf of the United
States, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the
Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPOA), 16 3 the Federal Circuit
16 4
Bar Association, and several law professors.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 12; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note
78, at 3; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4.
160. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L (W.D. Okla. Jan. 7, 2005) (order denying defendant's motion for reconsideration and granting defendant's alternative motion
for certification).
161. See Order Granting Appeal, supra note 21.
162. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 3. The Federal Circuit has
shown "extreme reluctance" to accept an interlocutory appeal in a patent case, which
makes Voda "all the more surprising as the Federal Circuit oddly granted an interlocu*tory appeal.., with very few of the critical facts needed for a decision." Wegner, supra
note 18, at 33. Evidencing the lack of a developed record on the foreign patents, in view
of the appeal, Cordis did not answer Dr. Voda's amended complaint and no discovery
was taken on the foreign patents. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 3.
163. An executive from Johnson & Johnson, which owns the defendant, Cordis Corporation, holds one of the forty-five board positions in the IPOA. Igielski, supra note
121.
164. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Defendant-Appellant, Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-1238); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Federal Circuit Bar Association in Support of
Defendant-Appellant's Position Seeking Reversal of the District Court's Aug. 2, 2004
Order, Voda, 476 F.3d 887 (No. 05-1238) [hereinafter Federal Circuit Bar Association
Briefl; Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant, Voda, 476 F.3d 887 (No. 05-1238); Professors' Brief, supra note 8; U.S. Brief,
supra note 44.
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After oral arguments on January 12, 2006,165 the Federal Circuit eventually handed down a long-awaited opinion more than a year later. 166 On
February 1, 2007, in a 2-1 decision, the panel majority ruled that the district court abused its discretion by assuming jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's
foreign patents. 16 7 The majority clearly set forth the two-part test for the
appropriate exercise of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367,168
requiring both (1) the presence of jurisdiction under § 1367(a) and (2) an
"appropriate decision" to exercise that jurisdiction under § 1367(c). 16 9
Finding that the district court abused its discretion under the second
1 70
prong of the analysis in failing to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c),
the court did not squarely address the first prong of the analysis, whether
the district court had authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(a). 17 1 Thus, the court refocused the inquiry from whether the district court "could" exercise jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign patent
infringement claims under § 1367(a) to whether it "ought" to have done so
"as a matter of judicial discretion under § 1367(c)."'17 2
Under the first prong of the supplemental jurisdiction analysis,
whether § 1367(a) authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent
claims, the majority noted that the district court was correct in that Mars
did not establish a per se rule barring U.S. courts from adjudicating foreign patents. 17 3 Thus, the court clarified the opposing interpretations of
Mars in earlier district court decisions. 17 4 Further, the court explained
that the Mars factors 175 do not supplant the Gibbs test codified in
§ 1367(a) and are neither an exhaustive list of factors to consider nor necessary conditions for finding supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(a). 17 6 The court, however, objected to the district court's failure to
articulate any analysis of relevant factors, 177 merely concluding that "allegations in the amended complaint demonstrate that this case is more akin
to Ortman than to Mars,"'178 which does not answer the legal question of
165. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4.
166. See Voda, 476 F.3d 887.
167. See Igielski, supra note 121.
168. Takenaka, supra note 24.
169. Voda, 476 F.3d at 891.
170. Id.
171. See Igielski, supra note 121.
172. Id. As Igielski notes, there is both "logical and historical irony in the Voda
approach." Id. Logically, it seems that a court can only decline to exercise jurisdiction
when the court ascertains that it has jurisdiction. Id. This is the approach that the
Federal Circuit took in Mars, holding that it was erroneous for the district court to
assume that it had jurisdiction under § 1367(a) before declining to exercise jurisdiction
under § 1367(c). Id.
173. Voda, 476 F.3d at 895.
174. See supra pp. 116-117 for a discussion of district courts' disagreement over
whether Mars established a per se rule that U.S. courts could never have supplemental
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims.
175. See supra pp. 114-115 for a discussion of the Mars factors.
176. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 895.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 895-96 (quoting Order Granting Amendment, supra note 20).

540

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 40

whether the claims satisfy the Gibbs test. 17 9 Nevertheless, reasoning that it
was "more prudent ... not to decide this 'common nucleus of operative
fact' question in the first instance,"' 80 the court refrained from deciding
whether Dr. Voda's foreign patent infringement claims satisfied the threshold requirement of § 1367(a). 18 1
Instead, the court's decision turned on the district court's abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the foreign patent claims without
performing a proper § 1367(c) discretionary analysis. 18 2 The court held
that the § 1367(c) considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and other exceptional circumstances, including international treaty obligations, constitute compelling reasons to decline
jurisdiction in this case. 18 3 Although the interlocutory appeal was taken
on the pleadings, the Federal Circuit demanded a thorough analysis of
these factors as a "condition precedent to the proper exercise of [supplemental] jurisdiction," emphasizing that § 1367(c) requires a case-specific
inquiry at every stage of litigation. 184 In regard to each factor, the court set
"tough standards"185-further displaying the Federal Circuit's hostility
toward the adjudication of foreign patent claims in U.S. courts.
First, the court noted that a district court's exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims could undermine the international
treaty obligations of the United States, constituting an exceptional circumstance to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4). 18 6 The international
patent treaties, including the Paris Convention, the PCT, and TRIPS, to
which the United States and each foreign country whose patents were at
issue are parties, do not contemplate or allow one jurisdiction to adjudicate
the patents of another. 18 7 Although conceding that the treaties do not
expressly prohibit courts from adjudicating foreign patent claims, the
court explained that each affirms the independence of member nations'
patent granting and adjudication systems. 18 8 Therefore, regardless of the
harmonization trend that these treaties may represent, the court found that
"we as the U.S. judiciary should not unilaterally decide either for our government or for other foreign sovereigns that our courts will become the
adjudicating body for any foreign patent with a [sufficiently related] U.S.
179. Id. at 896.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 897; Adams, supra note 143.
182. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 898.
183. See id.
184. Igielski, supra note 121 (quoting Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,
173 (1997)).
185. Id.
186. Voda, 476 F.3d at 900.
187. See id. at 898-99.
188. See id. at 899. To inform its analysis, the court contrasted these treaties with the
EPC, which has rules specifying courts of exclusive jurisdiction. See id. at 899 n.8. The
court further noted that even members of the EPC have not been able to agree on a
centralized European patent court. Id. See supra note 11 and infra Part II.C pp. 553-54
for a description of the EPC.
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equivalent .... "189 Thus, for the Federal Circuit, the international patent
treaties to which the United States is a party present a strong rationale to
decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c).
Next, the court determined that comity strongly disfavors the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign patent claims. 190 The
court held that the four considerations of comity from Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court' 9 ' did not support
the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction because (1) there
is no international duty to adjudicate the foreign claims, (2) Dr. Voda did
not show that adjudicating his foreign patent claims would enhance convenience, (3) Dr. Voda failed to show that foreign courts would inadequately
protect his foreign patent rights, and (4) the exercise of jurisdiction could
prejudice the rights of foreign governments. 192 Thus, the court concluded
that exercising jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign patent infringement
claims would "undermine the 'spirit of cooperation' underlying the comity
1 93
doctrine."'
Further, the court concluded that exercising jurisdiction in this case
would risk "unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations," which ordinarily should be avoided. 194 The court reasoned that
because the foreign countries whose patents were at issue had specialized
judges, resources, and procedures to foster integrity and consistency in the
application of their patent laws, exercising jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's for19 5
eign patents could disrupt their established procedures.
The court also found that judicial economy failed to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case because U.S. courts and
juries lacked knowledge of and experience with the foreign patent regimes
at issue. 19 6 Going further, the court noted that, under § 1367(c)(2), the
adjudication of Dr. Voda's five foreign patents may substantially
predominate his U.S. patent claims.' 97 Moreover, the court emphasized
that the United States is not a member of any international treaty requiring
foreign countries to recognize or enforce its judgments. 198 Thus, the court
countered the argument that consolidating foreign patent claims in one
U.S. court would be more efficient with the "major drawback ' 19 9 of the
189. Voda, 476 F.3d at 900.
190. See id. at 900-03.
191. See supra p. 110 for a discussion of these factors.
192. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 901; Adams, supra note 143; lgielski, supra note 121.
193. Voda, 476 F.3d at 902.
194. See id. (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004)).
195. Id. at 902-03. By way of analogy, the court further pointed out that foreign
courts' exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. patent claims would destroy Congress's attempt
to unify U.S. patent jurisprudence by creating the Federal Circuit to which Congress
granted exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals on patent claims. Id. at 903.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, In Reviewing District Court's Finding of Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Foreign Patent Infringement Claims, Panel Majority of Federal
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uncertainty of foreign enforcement due to the present lack of international
20 0
mechanisms to secure the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad.
Finally, the court opined that the act of state doctrine may make the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent claims "fundamentally unfair."' 2 0 1 Unconvinced that the grant of a patent by a sovereign
is not an act of state, the court assumed, without deciding, that the act of
state doctrine applied to foreign patent claims. 20 2 Under this assumption,
U.S. courts could not question the validity of a foreign patent and would
have to adjudicate the patent claim regardless of validity or enforceability. 20 3 Because many patent cases are resolved on validity or enforceability
grounds, exercising such jurisdiction could be unfair to the alleged
20 4
infringer.
Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that the district court
was compelled to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign
patent infringement claims under § 1367(c). 20 5 Because the district court
failed to undertake any analysis under § 1367(c), the court held that the
district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction. 20 6 Therefore, the court vacated the order of the district court granting Dr. Voda leave to amend his complaint to add his foreign patent
infringement claims pursuant to § 1367.207
In her lengthy dissent, Judge Pauline Newman concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over Dr.
Voda's foreign patent infringement claims. 20 8 The dissent argued that the
criteria of § 1367 "reinforce, rather than negate, the district court's exercise of discretion to accept Voda's amended complaint. ' 20 9 Specifically,
the dissent vehemently contested the majority's finding that judicial economy does not support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, arguing
that "[iut surely is not apparent that multiple litigation of the same issues in
five countries and three languages is likely to be more economical of judicial time and litigation expense ... than resolving all of the issues before
one judge in one case and one language." 2 10 Furthermore, the dissent
argued that, rather than merely considering convenience to U.S. courts, the
court could have considered the overwhelming convenience to both parties
of avoiding multiple litigations in foreign countries. 2 1' Pointing to extensive supporting case law, the dissent argued that U.S. courts routinely
Circuit Finds Abuse of Discretion Based on Comity, Judicial Economy, Convenience, and
Fairness, INT'L L. UPDATE (Transnational Law Assocs., LLC, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2007.
200. See Adams, supra note 143; Schmertz & Meier, supra note 199.
201. Voda, 476 F.3d at 904.
202. Id. at 903; see Adams, supra note 143; Schmertz & Meier, supra note 199.
203. Voda, 476 F.3d at 904; see Adams, supra note 143.
204. Voda, 476 F.3d at 904.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 905.
208. See Adams, supra note 143.
209. Voda, 476 F.3d at 909 (Newman, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 913.
211. See id. at 911; Igielski, supra note 121.
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determine and apply foreign law.2 1 2 Adopting a view common to proponents of patent harmonization, 2 13 the dissent emphasized that the application of foreign patent law would not be a significant challenge to U.S.
courts because similar policies underlie the patent law of all industrialized
2 14
nations.
Significantly, the dissent emphasized the broad restrictive effect of the
majority's decision on the possibility of multinational patent enforcement
in U.S. courts. 2 15 Judge Newman's opinion stressed that the majority's
"extreme limitation and bar" 2 16 on the district court's exercise of discretion to assume supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent claims "essentially eliminates" any such discretion in foreign patent cases. 2 17 For Judge
Newman, "in contrast to the case-specific analyses in precedent," under the
majority's opinion, "it would always be an abuse of discretion for the district court to decide foreign patent issues, unless some sort of new treaty is
2 18
produced."
2.

Implications for Multinational Patent Enforcement in U.S. Courts

The dissent's characterization of the breadth of the Voda holding is
likely not overstated, 2 19 as the facts of Voda arguably approached an ideal
case for consolidation of foreign patent claims. 220 Both the plaintiff and
the defendant were U.S. nationals. 22 ' Furthermore, the foreign patents
shared a common lineage in that they all originated from a common PCT
application and, additionally, they were counterparts of the asserted U.S.
patents. 2 22 Moreover, the domestic and foreign acts constituting infringement were identical, 22 3 involving direct infringement of a single accused
212. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 906-09 (Newman, J., dissenting); Takenaka, supra note 24.
213. See Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 18-21 ("[l~t is simply inaccurate to assert

that assumption of foreign patent infringement claims will invariably lead U.S. courts
into unknown landscapes. Core doctrines of the leading patent-issuing states are substantially similar to the point of identity .... "); Wegner, supra note 18, at 2; Takenaka,
supra note 24.
214. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 917 (Newman, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 906-17.
216. Id. at 917.
217. Id. at 910.
218. Id. at 909.
219. See Adams, supra note 143.
220. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 15 ("Indeed, if the facts of this case do
not justify exercise of jurisdiction over some or all of the Counterpart Patents then this
Court should simply forthrightly and plainly announce that no such claims should ever
be entertained. And yet, the case for jurisdiction is strong-especially given the unique
facts of this case.").

221. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 890; Ramsey A1-Salaam, Presentation at the High Technology Protection Summit at the University of Washington School of Law: Adjudicating
Foreign Intellectual Property Claims in United States Courts 1 (July 21, 2000), available

at http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number6/A-Salaam.pdf.
222. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 910-11 (Newman, J., dissenting); Elmer & Garcia, supra
note 13, at 6. The parties disagreed about the extent of similarity between the patents;

Cordis argued that the patents differed materially, whereas Dr. Voda argued that they
differed only in slight respects. Voda, 476 F.3d at 895.
223. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 6; Rader, supra note 14, at 5.
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device. 2 24 Finally, only monetary damages were sought against the defendant, a U.S. company with substantial U.S. assets, 22 5 preventing the need
22 6
for foreign enforcement of a judgment on the foreign patent claims.
Despite the strong argument for supplemental jurisdiction based on these
facts, the Federal Circuit still found that the district court abused its discretion in assuming supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Voda's foreign patent
infringement claims.
Therefore, although the Voda decision did not completely eliminate the
possibility of supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent claims, it
largely forecloses any such opportunity. 22 7 With the exception of the obligations of the United States under international patent treaties, the majority nominally made its analysis specific to Dr. Voda's foreign patent
claims;2 28 however, the dissent is correct in that most of the Federal Circuit's findings are generic to all foreign patent claims. 22 9 For example, the
majority neither analyzed the specific patent judicial systems of any of the
foreign countries whose patents were at issue nor addressed the extent of
difference between U.S. patent law and the patent laws of the foreign countries whose patents were at issue. 230 Furthermore, although the court
noted that a change in circumstances, such as "if the United States were to
231
enter into a new international patent treaty," might alter the analysis,
23
2
there are currently no plans for such a treaty.
Finally, despite the particularly low risk of offending a foreign sovereign because the case involved
only U.S. parties and no foreign sovereign's cooperation would have been
necessary to secure the requested monetary judgment, the Federal Circuit
still found that comity was a compelling basis to decline jurisdiction over
the foreign patent claims. 23 3 Thus, the Voda court's comity analysis
appears to largely preempt federal jurisdiction over foreign patent
34
claims.

2

As such, it would be difficult to imagine a foreign patent claim that
would pass the Federal Circuit's rigorous analysis laid out in both Mars
and Voda. For diversity jurisdiction cases, the rigorous application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine in the Mars dicta ensures that U.S. courts
would properly assume jurisdiction over foreign patents based on diversity
224. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 895; Igielski, supra note 121.
225. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 8 ("The most compelling case for consolidation occurs when the plaintiff seeks only a damage award and the enforcement of that
award in the United States.").
226. See lgielski, supra note 121.
227. See Takenaka, supra note 24.
228. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 899-905.
229. See id. at 909 (Newman, J., dissenting); Adams, supra note 143; lgielski, supra
note 121.
230. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 902-03; Adams, supra note 143.
231. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 905.
232. See id. at 916 (Newman, J., dissenting).
233. See lgielski, supra note 121.
234. See id.
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jurisdiction only in rare cases. 23 5 For supplemental jurisdiction, the two
Federal Circuit decisions set tough standards for both prongs of the § 1367
analysis. First, in the § 1367(a) analysis of Mars, the Federal Circuit's rigorous application of the Mars factors limits the number of foreign patent
23 6
claims that would pass the "common nucleus of operative fact" test.
Moreover, even if a claim were to pass the first prong of the supplemental
jurisdiction analysis under § 1367(a), the Voda decision severely restricts
judicial discretion to exercise jurisdiction under § 1367(c). 2 3 7 Thus, as
emphasized in Judge Newman's dissent, Voda significantly limited the possibility of a U.S. court assuming supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims. 238 Although the Voda decision may be
disappointing for patent litigants that must pursue litigation in various
national courts, Europe's example demonstrates the wisdom of the Federal
Circuit's restriction of multinational patent enforcement in U.S. courts.
II.

Europe

A.

Multinational Patent Injunctions: Dutch Courts Attack Patent
Territoriality

Although Europe has a streamlined method for national patent acquisition under the European Patent Convention (EPC), 239 until recently, patentees had no recourse to a similarly centralized patent enforcement forum
in Europe and, thus, had to pursue separate patent infringement litigations
in national courts. 240 The 1989 Dutch Supreme Court decision in Lincoln
v. Interlas,24 1 however, began a trend of multinational patent enforcement,
24 2
attacking the traditional territoriality of patent rights.
In Lincoln v. Interlas, the Dutch Supreme Court granted an injunction
against trademark infringement in Belgium and Luxembourg in addition to
the Netherlands. 2 43 Interlas, a Dutch company, imported diesel welding
units bearing the "Lincoln" trademark from the United States into the
Netherlands, modified the units, and offered them for sale throughout
Europe. 24 4 The Dutch owners of the "Lincoln" trademark sued Interlas in
the Netherlands for trademark infringement. 24 5 Because the plaintiffs'
235. See Mars II, 24 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Chisum, supra note 18, at
613; Thomas, supra note 1, at 324; Wegner, supra note 18, at 27. See supra pp. 535 for a
discussion of the Mars dicta.
236. See Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375; Chisum, supra note 18, at 613. See supra pp.
533-34 for a discussion of the Mars § 1367(a) analysis.
237. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 909 (NewmanJ, dissenting); Adams, supra note 143; Igielski, supra note 121.
238. See Takenaka, supra note 24.
239. See supra note 11 and infra Part I.C pp. 553-54 for a description of the EPC.
240. Thomas, supra note 1, at 299.
241. Judgment of Nov. 24, 1989, HR, 1992 NJ 404 (Neth.).
242. Bender, supra note 3, at 68; John Gladstone Mills III, A Transnational Patent Convention for the Acquisition and Enforcement of International Rights, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 83, 103 (2002); Thomas, supra note 1, at 299.
243. Mills, supra note 242, at 104.
244. Thomas, supra note 1, at 299.
245. Mills, supra note 242, at 103; Thomas, supra note 1, at 299.
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trademark rights were also effective in Belgium and Luxembourg, the plaintiffs' requested relief included an injunction against infringement in each
of these jurisdictions, which the lower court granted. 24 6 On appeal, the
defendants questioned the court's jurisdiction to issue the multinational
injunction, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that
to hold otherwise would lead to the "undesirable result" that the injured
24 7
party must file suit in every country where infringement occurred.
Thus, the Dutch Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that Dutch
courts had the right to enforce intellectual property rights outside the
2 48
Netherlands.
In view of the Interlas decision, Dutch lower courts granted several
multinational injunctions in cases involving patent infringement litigation. 249 For example, in the 1994 case, Chiron Corp. v. OrgananonAKZO
Pharma-OrganonTechnika-UBI,25 0 the plaintiff, a U.S. company, sued four
25 1
Dutch AKZO subsidiaries, one Belgium subsidiary, and a U.S. supplier.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court decision to grant an injunction
against all the defendants in the countries in which the plaintiff held a
2 52
European patent.
Although no specific legislation authorizing multinational injunctions
for patent infringement exists, 25 3 Dutch courts issuing such injunctions
relied primarily on two different international agreements: the EPC and the
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters. 25 4 Because Dutch domestic patent law is
integrated into the European system through the EPC, 2 55 Dutch courts
acknowledged the success of the EPC and reasoned that a single legal
determination under Dutch law is sufficient to establish patent status
throughout Europe and, in fact, is preferable to multiple suits for both simplicity and the credibility of the European patent system. 25 6 Further, as the
Netherlands is a member of the EU, Dutch courts relied on the Brussels
Convention, which applies only to member states of the EU. 25 7 The Brus246. Thomas, supra note 1, at 299.
247. Lincoln v. Interlas, Judgment of Nov. 24, 1989, HR, 1992 NJ 404, 1606 (Neth.);
Thomas, supra note 1, at 300.
248. Bender, supra note 3, at 68.
249. Bender, supra note 3, at 68-71; Mills, supra note 242, at 104-105. See Applied
Research Systems v. Organon, 1994 IER, No. 57 (Hague Ct. of App. Feb. 1994); Chiron
Corp. v. Organon AKZO Pharma-Organon Technika-UBI, 1994 IER, No. 10 (Hague Dist.
Ct. Jul. 1994), upheld 1994 IER, No. 24 (Hague Dist. Ct. Dec. 94); Philips v. Hemogram,
1992 BIE, No. 80 (Hague Dist. Ct. Dec. 1991).
250. 1994 IER, No. 10 (Hague Dist. Ct. Jul. 1994), upheld 1994 IER, No. 24 (Hague
Dist. Ct. Dec. 1994).
251. Bender, supra note 3, at 70.
252. Id.
253. Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
254. Thomas, supra note 1, at 301.
255. See id. at 301.
256. See Bender, supra note 3, at 71; Mills, supra note 242, at 105; Thomas, supra note
1, at 301.
257. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 OJ. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels
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sels Convention mandates contracting states to recognize and enforce juris258
dictionally valid judgments rendered in one EU state.
To the extent that Dutch courts issued multinational injunctions
outside of Europe, such reliance on the EPC and the Brussels Convention
ended, making the validity of such injunctions more questionable. 2 59 Nevertheless, Dutch courts considered themselves competent to adjudicate
non-European patents. 260 For example, in the 1992 case of Philips v.
Hemogram,26 1 a Dutch court granted an injunction covering all nations in
which the plaintiff held parallel patents, including Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, and the
2 62
Netherlands.
The Interlas line of cases altered patent law's traditional territorial
approach, which historically has required separate litigations in various
national courts, and in so doing created a strategic innovation for the management of international patent portfolios and international patent litigaConvention]. The Brussels Convention, which applies only to EU members, established
a comprehensive system of jurisdiction for litigation in civil and commercial matters,
including intellectual property, under which persons domiciled in a contracting state
may be sued in the courts of another contracting state. Blumer, supra note 119, at
337-38. The Brussels Convention has been amended several times, see Case C-4/03,
Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau
Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, para. 1, and was superseded in 2000 by the Brussels Regulation, which is very similar to the Brussels Convention, see Matthew H. Adler
& Michele Crimaldi Zarychta, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: The
United States Joins the Judgment Enforcement Band, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 16
(2006). Because the ECJ decisions in Roche and GAT were decided under the Brussels
Convention, for consistency and simplicity, the term "Brussels Convention" is used
throughout this Note.
258. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 301-02. The Dutch courts relied on Article 24 of
the Brussels Convention, a jurisdictional mandate, which provides that "[a]pplication
may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provisional, including protective, measures, as may be available under the laws of that state, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of
the matter." Brussels Convention, supra note 257, art. 24; Thomas, supra note 1, at 302.
Other jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention are less supportive of the
Dutch approach, including Article 16(4), which provides for exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning the registration or validity of patents in "the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, taken place or is
under the terms of an international convention deemed to have taken place." Thomas,
supra note 1, at 302-03; see Brussels Convention, supra note 257, art. 16(4). Nevertheless, Article 16(4) has been of little consequence because the Dutch action granting preliminary relief is a summary proceeding called a "kort geding," which is not subject to
ordinary rules of evidence and has no pre-trial discovery and no oral testimony from
witnesses. Mills, supra note 242, at 106; Thomas, supra note 1, at 302. Because the kort
geding procedure is considered provisional, Dutch courts ordinarily do not resolve validity and simply determine the likelihood of success elsewhere. Thomas, supra note 1, at
302-03. See infra Part I.B for a more detailed discussion of the articles of the Brussels
Convention on which plaintiffs seeking multinational patent enforcement in courts of
contracting states relied, as well as the ECJ's determination of the applicability of these
provisions.
259. Thomas, supra note 1, at 303.
260. Id.
261. 1992 BIE, No. 80 (Hague Dist. Ct. Dec. 1991).
262. Mills, supra note 242, at 69; Thomas, supra note 1, at 303-04.
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tion. 26 3 As a result of the willingness of Dutch courts to grant
multinational injunctions, the Netherlands quickly became the preferred
2 64
forum for patent infringement litigation in Europe in the 1990s.
Although other European countries, most notably Germany, embraced the
Dutch multinational approach to patent litigation, 26 5 the inefficiencies and
difficulties of multinational patent enforcement in European courts prevented it from becoming the "dominant model" of enforcing patent rights
in multiple countries. 26 6 In addition to lingering questions about its legality, the use of multinational patent enforcement in national courts often
led to various national validity or anti-suit related follow-up or collateral
proceedings in the courts of foreign nations that granted the patents-in2 67
suit, leading to increased costs and delay.

The Dutch approach remained controversial and was not embraced
throughout the EU. 26 8 Specifically, courts in the United Kingdom developed an opposing body of patent cases in which they refused to grant multinational patent injunctions. 2 69 In the 1995 case, Chiron Corp. v. Organon
Teknika Ltd. (No 10),27 0 for example, Mr. Justice Aldous specifically
rejected multinational patent injunctions, stating in dicta, "At one time I
wondered whether it would be right for this court to do the same as the
Dutch court, but have concluded that it would not be right for this court to
'2 7 1
grant an injunction which had effect outside the United Kingdom."
B. The ECJ Assault on Multinational Patent Enforcement
1. Roche and GAT
In two decisions handed down on July 13, 2006, Roche Nederland v.

Primus 27 2 and Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen

und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG (GAT), 2 73 the ECJ 274 effectively ended
263. Bender, supra note 3, at 72.
264. Thomas, supra note 1, at 305.
265. Schuster, supra note 35.

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Bender, supra note 3, at 72; Thomas, supra note 1, at 304.
269. Bender, supra note 3, at 73; Mills, supra note 242, at 105; See Chiron Corp. v.
Organon Teknika Ltd. (No 10), [1995] F.S.R. 325 (Eng. Ch. 1995); Coin Controls Ltd. v.
Suzo International (U.K.) Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 660 (Eng. Ch. 1997).
270. [1995] F.S.R. 325 (Eng. Ch. 1995).
271. Id. at 338.
272. Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535.
273. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509.
274. The ECJ was created in 1957 by the Treaties of Rome. Kevin Andrew Swartz,
Powerful, Unique, and Anonymous: The European Court of Justice and Its Continuing
Impact on the Formation of the European Community, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 687, 691
(1994). Under the Brussels Convention, supreme courts of the contracting states can
submit questions of interpretation on unsettled areas of Community law to the ECJ for
preliminary rulings. Blumer, supra note 119, at 337. In such cases, the ECJ, in theory, is
to refer solely to the legal issue of Community law without considering the underlying
facts of the case, but, in practice, the court often becomes quite involved in the facts of
the case, making clear how the national court should finally decide the case. Swartz,
supra, at 692-93. After the ECJ settles the disputed legal issue, the national court that
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the practice of multinational injunctions for patent infringement. 2 75 The
ECJ clarified that a European patent is merely a bundle of national and
territorial patent rights and, thus, reaffirmed the historic territoriality of
patent law despite the increasing harmonization of European patent
laws. 2 76 After proceedings lasting more than three years, the ECJ released

both decisions on the same day "like a shot from a double-barrel-rifle at
the concept [of multinational patent enforcement].

' 27 7

In seeking multinational injunctions for patent infringement against
multiple defendants domiciled throughout Europe, plaintiffs had made use
of the Article 6(1) exception to Article 2 of the Brussels Convention. 278
Article 2 of the Convention provides that persons domiciled in a contracting state of the Brussels Convention must be sued in the courts of that
state. 2 79 Article 6(1) provides an exception: when a plaintiff is suing multiple defendants domiciled in different contracting states, the defendants
may be sued in any contracting state where one of the defendants is
28 0
domiciled.
In the primary case, Roche, the ECJ, reasoning that there is never a
sufficient connection between foreign patent claims to necessitate consolidation, effectively eliminated the possibility of using an Article 6(1) exception to bring a consolidated patent infringement suit against multiple
defendants domiciled in different countries. 28 1 The plaintiffs, Dr. Primus
and Dr. Goldenberg, two U.S. doctors, attempted to make use of the Article
6(1) exception, bringing an infringement action in the Netherlands against
Roche Nederland, a Dutch company, and eight other companies in the
Roche group domiciled in the United States, Belgium, Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. 28 2 The plaintiffs
alleged that the nine co-defendants' conduct infringed the plaintiffs' European patent in their respective countries. 28 3 The eight non-Dutch compa28 4
nies in the Roche group contested the jurisdiction of the Dutch court.

requested the preliminary ruling must apply the court's ruling to the facts of the case.
Id. at 693.
275. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
276. See Emma Barraclough, ECJ Blocks Cross-Border Patent Litigation, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., Sept. 2006; Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
277. Schuster, supra note 35.
278. Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
279. Brussels Convention, supra note 257, art. 2.
280. Id. art. 6(1).
281. See Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535; R. Scott
MacKendrick, CrossingBorders: Trade-mark Issues and Concerns in Canadaand Elsewhere,
in AM. L.

INST., LITIGATING TRADEMARK,

DOMAIN NAME, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES

325, 327 (2006); Friedrich Klinkert et al., European Union: The (Cross) Border is Closed:
ECJ Rules on Patent Injunctions, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 20, 2006, http://
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=41396.
282. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 13-14; Klinkert et al, supra note 281.
283. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 13-14; Klinkert et al, supra note 281. The
patent in question was European patent No. 131 627, and the alleged infringement consisted of placing immuno-assay kits on the market. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para.
13-14.
284. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 13-14; Klinkert et al, supra note 281.
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Although the lower court determined that it had jurisdiction, 2 85 the Dutch
Supreme Court, on appeal, stayed the proceedings and submitted two
questions to the ECJ. 28 6 First, the Dutch Supreme Court asked the ECJ to
determine whether the Article 6(1) jurisdiction exception applies where a
number of different companies established in various contracting. states
are accused of infringing a common European patent in different contracting states. 28 7 Second, the court asked the ECJ to clarify within the
Article 6(1) jurisdiction exception the relevance of whether the alleged
infringing acts of the defendants are identical or similar, the defendants are
part of the same group of companies, and the defendants are acting under
a common policy.

2 88

Addressing the first question, the ECJ found that, under relevant case
law, Article 6(1) applies only if the different acts of the various defendants
are connected in such a way that "it is expedient to determine the actions
together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments. ' 28 9 The
ECJ determined that, even if the concept of the risk of "irreconcilable judg-

ments" is defined broadly as the risk of "contradictory decisions," there is
no such risk in the case of alleged patent infringement committed by differ-

ent defendants in different countries. 290 Because the defendants are different and the alleged infringement occurred in different countries, the
29 1
Simifactual situation for each individual action will also be different.
larly, the legal situation is different because a European patent is governed
29 2
by the national law of the contracting state for which it was granted.
Addressing the second question, the ECJ concluded that this holding
285. The Dutch and French governments supported the decision of the lower court,
but the U.K. government argued that Primus should have litigated nation-by-nation.
William Hoyng, Cross-Border Injunctions. Where Are We and Where Should We Go?,
MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 18, 2005, http://www.mondaq.c'om/article.asp?articleid33412.
286. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 16-17; Shaw, supra note 26, at 1. The
Supreme Court referred the following questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: "(1)
Is there a connection, as required for the application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, between a patent infringement action brought by a holder of a European patent
against a defendant having its registered office in the State of the court in which the
proceedings are brought, on the one hand, and against various defendants having their
registered offices in Contracting States other than that of the State of the court in which
the proceedings are brought, on the other hand, who, according to the patent holder, are
infringing that patent in one or more other Contracting States? (2) If the answer to
Question I is not or not unreservedly in the affirmative, in what circumstances is such a
connection deemed to exist, and is it relevant in this context whether, for example,- the
defendants form part of one and the same group of companies?- the defendants are
acting together on the basis of a common policy, and if so is the place from which that
policy originates relevant?- the alleged infringing acts of the various defendants are the
same or virtually the same?" Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 17. In the late 1990s,
the ECJ was asked to clarify such questions in two prior cases but both cases settled
before the ECJ could rule. See Schuster, supra note 35.
287. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 17-18; Klinkert et al, supra note 281.
288. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 17-18; Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
289. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 20; Klinkert et al, supra note 281.
290. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 25.
291. Id. at para. 27; Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
292. See Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 29-30; Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
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applies even if the defendant companies belong to the same group and
acted in identical or similar ways in accordance with a common policy,
2 93
because the legal situation would never be the same.
From a practical standpoint, the ECJ also pointed out that the advantages of a consolidated action were limited because consolidation would
multiply the number of courts with jurisdiction to hear a proceeding,
2 94
which would undermine legal certainty and encourage forum shopping.
Furthermore, as confirmed by the GAT decision, under Article 16(4) of the
Brussels Convention, proceedings concerning the validity of a patent must
take place in the national courts of the granting country. 295 Thus, because
patent validity is frequently challenged in infringement actions, some frag2 96
mentation of the proceedings is inevitable.
In GAT, the ECJ held that, under Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, 29 7 patent validity is to be determined exclusively by the national
courts of the granting state, which are uniquely qualified to assess the
validity of a national patent. 29 8 GAT, a German motor vehicle company,
brought a declaratory action before a regional court in Germany seeking a
declaration of noninfringement and, additionally, revocation of two French
patents after LuK, another Germany motor vehicle company, alleged that
GAT had infringed both of these patents.2 9 9 The regional court, the Landgericht Dusseldorf, held that it had international jurisdiction to adjudicate both the alleged infringement and invalidity actions and dismissed
GAT's action, holding the French patents at issue valid. 30 0 On appeal, the
higher regional court, the Oberlandesgeright Dusseldorf, stayed the proceedings and referred to the ECJ the question of whether the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention applies to
all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, including
30 1
those in which invalidity is raised as a defense to infringement.
293. Roche, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6535, at para. 34-35.
294. Id. at para. 37-38; Klinkert et al, supra note 281; Shaw, supra 26, at 2.
295. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, para. 31.
296. Id. at para. 17; Klinkert et al., supra note 281.
297. Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, which is now Article 22(4) of the Brussels Regulation, Barraclough, supra note 276, provides that "in proceedings concerned
with the registration or validity of patents, . . . the courts of the Contracting State in
which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the
terms of an international convention deemed to have taken place" shall have exclusive
jurisdiction. Brussels Convention, supra note 257, art. 16(4).
298. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 22; Klinkert et al.,
supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2. The court emphasized that a number of
member states have set up specialized courts for patent cases, making the exclusive
jurisdiction for validity claims even more important. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik,
2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 22.
299. GesellschaftfurAntriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 8-10; Klinkert et al.,
supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
300. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 11; Klinkert et al.,
supra note 281.
301. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 12; Klinkert et al.,
supra note 281. The Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf referred the following question to
the ECJ: "Should Article 16(4) of the Convention ... be interpreted as meaning that the

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 40

Defining the scope of Article 16(4), the ECJ ruled that the Article "is to
be interpreted as meaning that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down
therein concerns all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a
patent, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a
plea of objection. '30 2 The ECJ noted that the provision does not apply
when validity is not challenged. 30 3 Once the validity of a patent is challenged, however, irrespective of whether the party challenging validity
brought proceedings specifically to invalidate the patent or merely raised
invalidity as a defense to an infringement action, the national court of the
patent-granting state has exclusive jurisdiction. 30 4 The ECJ reasoned that
to hold otherwise would undermine the binding nature of the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of Article 16(4).305 Furthermore, circumventing the
exclusive jurisdiction of Article 16(4) would increase the number of jurisdictions able to determine the validity of a patent, thereby undermining
predictability by increasing the risk of conflicting decisions by different
national courts, which the Brussels Convention specifically seeks to
30 6
avoid.
2.

Implicationsfor Multinational Patent Enforcement in European
National Courts

The ECJ's decisions severely limit the possibility of centralizing
infringement claims on foreign patents before a single European national
court, quelling the trend towards centralized patent infringement litigation
in European jurisdictions. 30 7 After Roche, multinational relief on a European patent is theoretically available in the limited circumstance in which a
patentee sues a single defendant in its country of domicile for infringing
activity in multiple states. 30 8 Moreover, in light of GAT, the defendant simply has to challenge validity to limit the suit to the patent in that jurisdiction; the foreign patent infringement proceedings are then unable to
exclusive jurisdiction conferred by that provision on the courts of the Contracting State
in which the deposit or registration of a patent has been applied for, has taken place or is
deemed to have taken place under the terms of an international convention only applies
if proceedings (with erga omnes effect) are brought to declare the patent invalid or are
proceedings concerned with the validity of patents within the meaning of the aforementioned provision where the defendant in a patent infringement action or the claimant in
a declaratory action to establish that a patent is not infringed pleads that the patent is
invalid or void and that there is also no patent infringement for that reason, irrespective
of whether the court seised of the proceedings considers the plea in objection to be
substantiated or unsubstantiated and of when the plea in objection is raised in the
course of proceedings?" Gesellschaftfur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 12.
302. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 31.
303. Id. at para. 16; Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
304. Shaw, supra note 26, at 2; see Gesellschaftfur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509,
at para. 25.
305. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 26; Shaw, supra note
26, at 2
306. Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 28; Klinkert et al.,
supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
307. See Bender, supra note 3, at 49; Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note
26, at 1.
308. Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
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proceed. 30 9 As the ECJ noted in GAT, defendants usually challenge patent
validity in an infringement action, further decreasing the likelihood of a
case suitable for multinational patent enforcement. 3 10 Given the ECJ's
decision, defendants desiring to make the litigation more difficult and
expensive for plaintiffs will certainly be more apt to challenge validity, forcing the litigation to separate into different national litigations. Additionally, although it is unclear whether European courts would accept such a
case after the ECJ decisions, the rulings seem to allow for companies
accused or suspected of infringement without merit to seek, in the patentee's domicile country, a single, consolidated declaration of non-infringement. 3 1 1 Given the ruling in GAT, however, such an action could only
proceed if the accused or suspected infringer does not need to argue that
the patent is invalid because the non-infringement argument is sufficiently
strong. 3 12 In practice, therefore, multinational injunctions for patent
'3 1 3
infringement in Europe are "effectively dead."
The ECJ's decisions illustrate the need for a more harmonized
approach to European patent litigation. 3 14 As such, the decisions have
accelerated negotiations toward alternative methods of multinational patent enforcement in Europe, the Community Patent and the European Pat3 15
ent Litigation Agreement (EPLA).
C.

The Community Patent

The first harmonization of European patent law occurred with the
Munich Convention on the Grant of European Patents, also known as the
European Patent Convention (EPC), 3 16 which was signed on October 5,
1973 and became effective on October 7, 1977. 3 17 The EPC is a conglomerate of thirty-one European states that have agreed to a common European
patent granting system with a common European Patent Office (EPO) to
search and examine patent applications. 3 18 The EPC allows an applicant
to file a single patent application with the EPO. 3 19 If the EPO accepts the
application, it grants a European patent, which is actually a bundle of
309. Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
310. Gesellschaftfur Antriebstechnik, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, at para. 17.
311. See Schuster, supra note 35.
312. See id. The patentee would never question the validity of its own patent because
the patentee would immediately lose the action. Id.
313. Klinkert et al., supra note 281.
314. Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
315. See Barraclough, supra note 276; Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note
26, at 2.
316. Piotraut, supra note 11, at 61.
317. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19; Christopher Heath, HarmonizingScope and
Allocation of Patent Rights in Europe-Towards a New European Patent Law, 6 MIaQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 11, 11 (2002).

318. EUROPEAN PATENT

OFFICE,

supra note 15, at 1; Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19.

The EPC system is established outside the legal framework of the European Community
Treaty so European countries that are not EU members can join the EPC. Sascha E.
Schalkwijk, Community Patent: The EU Stuck Again?, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST (Law Jour-

nal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Sept. 2004.
319. Bender, supra note 3, at 58.
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national patents for each state designated in the patent application. 320 The
EPC, however, does not provide for a common European patent litigation
system. 3 21 National courts, applying their respective national laws, adjudi322
cate enforcement disputes, including infringement or revocation
3 23
actions.
The EPC was originally intended only to be a provisional tool, the first
step towards unifying the European patent system. 32 4 Following the EPC,
the Community Patent Convention (CPC) was to be the next step in creating a supranational European patent system. 3 25 Although the EPC has
been very successful, the CPC, which was signed in Luxembourg on
December 15, 1975, has never become effective. 32 6 The main idea of the
CPC is that, for EU members, the European patent, after being granted by
the EPO, would not be divided into separate national patents but would
become a single "supranational unitary Community patent," enforceable
32 7
under one uniform patent law in a special, centralized judicial system.
Thus, the CPC was to "eliminate the post-grant territorial limitations" of
the European patent within the EU. 328 Immediately after signing, however,
the CPC faced extensive problems that have prevented its ratification and,
32 9
consequently, its taking effect.
The first problem facing the CPC was its competence to decide the
validity of Community patents. 330 The original text of the CPC gave the
EPO exclusive competence to decide applications for the revocation of a
Community patent but authorized member states to grant their national
courts the competence to decide on counterclaims of invalidity in infringement suits.3 3 1 The national court's decision would bind only that particular state. 3 32 This rule, however, is inconsistent with the idea that the
Community patent is a single, supranational patent valid throughout the
33 3
EU.
320. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1; Bender, supra note 3, at 57; Di
Cataldo, supra note 11, at 20. The designation "European patent" is misleading. See Di
Cataldo, supra note 11, at 20. "[Iln fact, there is no single European Patent. Instead,
there are multiple national patents collectively referred to as a 'European Patent."' Id.
321. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1.
322. Id.; Heath, supra note 317, at 12. There is a nine-month time limit for filing an
opposition at the EPO, after which the party interested in seeking revocation must file
revocation actions in all the states for which the European patent was granted. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1.
323. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note

15, at 1.

324. Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19.
325. Bender, supra note 3, at 57, 59.
326. Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19; Schalkwijk, supra note 318.
327. Bender, supra note 3, at 57, 59; Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19.
328. Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 119, at 543.
329. Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 27.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. This is the rule that currently applies in the EPC, which holds that a determination on the validity of a patent granted by the EPO is only binding on that particular
state. Id.
333. Id.
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As a result, some states requested a common court for Community
patents. 33 4 Other states, specifically Denmark and Ireland, however,
3 35
asserted that their constitutions prohibited such a special patent court.
After fourteen years of discussion, the member states agreed on a solution
embodied in the 1989 Agreement, which was signed on December 15,
1989.336 The agreement gave national courts the competence to decide
invalidity in the first instance. 33 7 Because the states could not accept the
invalidation of a Community patent by another state's national court, the
validity decisions of national courts could be appealed to a Community
Patent Appeals Court (CoPAC). 338 Although the main purpose of CoPAC
was to avoid invalidation of a Community patent by a single national court,
CoPAC would also ensure a unified final interpretation of the validity of a
Community patent, furthering the goal of a unified European patent system. 3 3 9 Nevertheless, largely on account of disputes over the translation
requirements for Community patents, 3 40 several member states did not ratify the second version of the CPC by the December 31, 1991 deadline and,
341
consequently, it has not become effective.
The increased frequency of infringement suits across Europe over the
last ten years, along with the frequent non-uniform interpretations and
decisions of European national courts on EPO-granted patents, has raised
awareness of the importance of enforcement and sparked renewed
attempts to overcome the difficulties preventing a workable Community
Patent. 3 42 The 2003 amended proposal includes a more extensive Commu-

nity patent jurisdiction under the aegis of the ECJ, which would have jurisdiction over disputes regarding the invalidity or infringement of a
Community patent. 3 43

A new Community Patent Court, rather than

national courts, would exercise the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the first
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. CoPAC's competence would only encompass patent validity disputes and no
other disputes that could arise regarding a Community patent. Id. at 27-28. National
courts of second instance would ultimately grant remedies, such as damages and injunctive relief. Heath, supra note 317, at 13.
340. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 28; Schalkwijk, supra note 318, for a detailed
discussion of the translation debate that has largely prevented the establishment of the
Community Patent.
341. Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 28; Schalkwijk, supra note 318.
342. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 21; Bender, supra note 3, at 60; Heath, supra
note 317, at 13.
343. See Commission Proposalfor a Council Decision Establishingthe Community Patent
Court and ConcerningAppeals Before the Court of First Instance, at 6, COM (2003) 828
final (Dec. 23, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Commission Proposal]; Press Release, European
Cmm'n, Industrial Property: Commission Proposes Establishing Community Patent
Court (Feb. 2, 2004). Until the Community Patent Court is established, member states
would designate a limited number of national courts to exercise jurisdiction over Community patents. 2003 Commission Proposal, supra, at 10. At the end of the transitional
period, jurisdiction over Community patents would be conferred to on the ECJ. Id.
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instance. 34 4 The proposal also establishes a specialized patent appeal
chamber within the Court of First Instance, consisting of judges having
greater expertise in patent law. 3 45 In exceptional cases, the ECJ could

review a decision of the Court of First Instance. 3 46 The Community Patent
3 47
Court's judgments would be effective throughout the EU.
The detailed proposal also provides for the logistical arrangements of
proceedings before the Community Patent Court. The proceedings can
take place in any official EU language if the parties so request and the
Community Patent Court consents. 348 Nevertheless, the proposal established two default rules. 34 9 First, if the defendant is domiciled in an EU
member state, the language of the proceedings before the Community Patent Court would be the official EU language of that state or, if there is more
than one official language, the defendant can choose from the official languages.350 Second, if the defendant is not domiciled in an EU member
state, the language of the proceedings would be the official EU language of
the state that granted the Community patent. 35 ' Additionally, the Community Patent Court would operate under a uniform set of procedural
rules.3 52 Given that the Community Patent Court's judgments are effective

throughout the EU, for Community patents, the uniform jurisdictional system of the Community Patent Court would avoid the expense, inconvenience, and confusion inherent in patent litigation involving several
national courts. 35 3 Although the Community Patent concept has such

clear advantages, residual difficulties, especially concerning the extent and
3 54
legal effect of translations, continue to prevent an effective agreement.
D.

The European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA)

Faced with an unpromising deadlock in the Community Patent initiative, EPC member states began to explore other options to end the inconsistency of patent protection in Europe. 35 5 As European Commissioner for
Internal Market and Services, Charlie McGreevy, explained in a presentation to the European Parliament, "In an ideal world, the Community Patent
344. See 2003 Commission Proposal, supra note 343, at 6-7; Press Release, supra note
343. The Community Patent Court will consist of seven judges, including a president.
2003 Commission Proposal, supra note 343, at 7. The judges will be divided into two
chambers of three. Id. The seventh judge will be available for reinforcement as needed;
for example, if a judge is ill or the president must assume administration-related tasks.
Id.
345. 2003 Commission Proposal, supra note 343, at 9; Press Release, supra note 343.
346. Press Release, supra note 343.
347. Id.
348. 2003 Commission Proposal, supra note 343, at 8.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. Press Release, supra note 343.
353. See id. Of course, disputes involving national patents or European patents
would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Community Patent Court and, thus,
would still be decided by individual national courts. Id.
354. Schalkwijk, supra note 318.
355. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1-4.
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is the solution. But in the real world, this is not possible. Should [we] sit
around doing nothing? No, that would be grossly irresponsible." 35 6 As
such, the EPC member states established a Working Party on Litigation in
June 1999 with the mandate to submit an optional agreement on an integrated judicial system for European patent litigation, the European Patent
Litigation Agreement (EPLA). 3 5 7 The goal of the EPLA is to improve the
European patent system by creating an efficient litigation system to
increase legal certainty by ensuring uniform patent law interpretation. 35 8
Another objective of the proposed EPLA is to reduce the number of cases
requiring multiple separate actions, thereby reducing costs for parties. 35 9
Unlike the Community Patent initiative, the proposed EPLA would consist
only of a judicial system to interpret European patents granted through the
EPO; it would not revise the patent granting system to create a unified
3 60
Community patent, a further goal of the Community Patent initiative.
The integrated judicial system in the EPLA draft agreement provides
for a new European Patent Judiciary, which is to be composed of the European Patent Court and a supervisory body, the Administrative Committee. 36 ' The European Patent Court, which would have jurisdiction to hear
infringement and revocation actions concerning European patents across
any state that accedes to the EPLA, would consist of the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeal, both of which would be comprised of
international panels of legally and technically qualified judges. 3 62 The
Court of First Instance would consist of a Central Division and several
Regional Divisions. 36 3 The single common Court of Appeal would hear
appeals from the Courts of First Instance. 3 64 Furthermore, the draft agreement enables the Court of Appeal, acting as Facultative Advisory Council,
to deliver non-binding opinions on any point of law concerning European
or harmonized national patent law to national courts trying infringement
and validity actions. 365 The common Court of Appeal would help guarantee consistent case law, improving legal certainty for European patents. 3 66
If a state decides to join the EPLA, it must choose between transferring
jurisdiction to the European Patent Court or merely allowing its courts to
356. Intellectual Property: McGreevy Outlines 'Concerted Push' for European Patents,
EUR. REP. (European Info. Serv., London), Sept. 29, 2006 [hereinafter 'Concerted Push'
for European Patents].
357. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 1. The main states active in the
Working Party on Litigation are Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 5.

358. Id. at 8.
359. Id. at 9.
360. See id. at 4; Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19.
361. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5-6.
362. Id. On request by the European Patent Court, the ECJ will issue preliminary
rulings binding on the European Patent Court in so far as its decision takes effect in a
member state of the European Union. Id. at 7.

363. Id. at 6.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Patents: All-English Patents Seen Looming, EUR. REP. (European Info. Serv.,
London), Dec. 21, 2006.
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present requests for opinions to the Facultative Advisory Council. 3 67
In contrast to the unified judicial system for European patents,
national courts would continue to handle infringement and revocation proceedings concerning national patents. 36 8 Additionally, national courts
would retain jurisdiction to order provisional and protective measures in
36 9
disputes relating to both national and European patents.
The EPLA also has an extensively detailed language regime based on
that of the EPC granting system but adapted to post-grant litigation. 3 70 In a
proceeding before the Central Division, the language of the proceeding
would be that of the proceeding before the EPO. 3 7 1 Furthermore, in a proceeding before a Regional Division located in a state having an EPO official
language as an official language, the language of the proceeding would be
that language. 3 72 Finally, in a proceeding before a Regional Division
located in a state having either more than one or no official language that
is an EPO official language, the language of the proceeding would be any
official language of the EPO that the state designates. 3 73 The language of
the proceeding before the Court of Appeal would always be the language of
the first-instance proceedings. 3 74 Upon agreement by the parties, the
court may allow the use of another language during all or part of the
375
proceedings.
As support for the EPLA from judges, academics, members of the
European industry, and expert groups increases, optimism about the successful conclusion of EPLA negotiations continues to rise. 3 76 Results of
the European Commission's January 2006 survey of European practition3 77
ers revealed that the majority of participants support the draft EPLA.
Specifically, most support the language regime, the specialized judges that
ensure high quality decisions, and the judicial system that balances simple
access to court through regional divisions with legal certainty through the
central Court of Appeal. 37 8 Supporters also point to decreased litigation
costs on account of a single, centralized suit rather than multiple disjointed
proceedings. 3 79 For example, Member of the European Parliament (MEP)
367. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 6.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 7. To provide for a situation in which the parties agree on a language other
than an official language of the EPO, the rules of procedure will have further rules on
simultaneous interpretation during oral proceedings and translation of the file. Id.
376. Id. at 9; Next Steps, supra note 29; see Schalkwijk, supra note 318.
377. EUROPEAN COMM'N, FUTURE PATENT POLICY IN EUROPE 4 (2006), http://ec.europa.

eu/internalmarket/indprop/docs/patent/hearing/report.en.pdf

[hereinafter FUTURE

PATENT POLICY].

378. Id.
379. Next Steps, supra note 29; Industrial Property: McGreevy's Concerted Push for
Patents, EUR. REP. (European Info. Serv., London), Sept. 25, 2006 [hereinafter Industrial

Property].
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Klaus-Heiner Lehne argues that a patent dispute in three EU countries
would be 45% cheaper in the EPLA than with the disjointed litigations currently necessary. 38 0 In fact, as the European Commission's Internal Market Spokesman, Oliver Drewes, points out, despite puzzling comments to
the contrary, the EPLA would not be more expensive for litigants than the
current system, because "[o]ne of the ongoing ideas is that you could also
381
go to a local court, not a European court."
The initiative, however, is not without its problems. The main concerns relate to the judicial system and costs. 38 2 The debate over the judicial system focuses on the degree of centralization and the nature of the
local Courts of First Instance. 38 3 Another crucial concern is that the EPLA
would drastically increase patent litigation costs. Although the position is
contested, some MEPs argue that small companies could face litigation
bills of 97,000 to 415,000384 Euros for a medium-scale action under the
proposed EPLA. 38 5 Additionally, some countries, especially France, object
to the language scheme, which concentrates on the EPC official languages. 3 86 France has highlighted constitutional concerns for the EU,
arguing that it is unacceptable to create a non-EU legal system with a nonEU court. 38 7 Additionally, France has raised institutional compatibility
concerns regarding possible contradictions between the EPLA's proposed
intergovernmental court and the judicial order established by European
Community treaties. 388 Finally, because the EPLA is an optional additional agreement, if the EPLA were adopted, EPC contracting states would
have the option not to sign and, thus, could continue using the EPC in its
present form. 38 9 It is likely that a number of EPC contracting states would
390
not participate.

380. Industrial Property, supra note 379.
381. Id.
382. Intellectual Property: McGreevy Told European Community Patent Not Dead, EUR.
REP. (European Info. Serv., London), Oct. 2, 2006 [hereinafter Intellectual Property].
383. See Charlie McGreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt. & Servs., Closing
Remarks at Public Hearing on Future Patent Policy (July 12, 2006) [hereinafter Closing
Remarks].
384. This represents approximately $130,600-$558,500. See FIN. MGMT. SERV., TREASURY REPORTING RATES (2007) (reporting that, as of June 30, 2007, $1 equals 0.7430
Euros).
385. FUTURE PATENT POLICY, supra note 377, at 5; Industrial Property, supra note 379;
Intellectual Property,supra note 382.
386. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 6; 'Concerted Push'for European
Patents, supra note 356.
387. Innovation/Intellectual Property: Solution Emerging on European Dispute Settlement, EUR. REP. (European Info. Serv., London), Oct. 24, 2006 [hereinafter Innovation/
Intellectual Property].
388. Industrial Property,supra note 379.
389. Schalkwijk, supra note 318.
390. Id.
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The Future of European Patent Litigation: Community Patent, EPLA,
or Both?

The patent litigation system in Europe has generated an extraordinary
level of interest, as evidenced not only by the European Commission's initiative to institute a consultation on the European patent system that began
inJanuary 2006391 but also by the "unprecedented" 2,515 responses to the
survey. 3 92 As a result of this heightened interest, on September 8, 2006,
Charlie McGreevy vowed to make a "concerted push to improve the patent
system in Europe." 3 93 As McGreevy explained, the consultation results
make clear that there is widespread industry support for the Community
Patent concept, but not for the "current Community Patent deal on the
table-the 2003 Common Political Approach," which fails to offer an
affordable and competitive Community patent. 3 94 Many remain unsatisfied with the proposed language regime, as well as the seemingly inade3 95
quate jurisdictional arrangements.
In addition to supporting the Community Patent concept, both industry and attorneys favor the Community's involvement in the EPLA. 39 6 The
two initiatives are no longer seen as mutually exclusive, 39 7 because even if

the Community Patent were to become effective with a common patent
judicial system, the EPLA offers a unified jurisdiction for the hundreds of
thousands of patents that the EPO already granted. 3 98 Thus, McGreevy
prudently intends to pursue both, proposing a "two-prong approach": (1)
advance the Community Patent with new ideas and (2) in parallel, bring
3 99
the EPLA negotiations to finality.
The European Parliament's joint resolution of October 12, 2006 seconded McGreevy's double-pronged "concerted push." 400 Similar to
McGreevy, the joint resolution called on the Commission to explore "all
possible ways of improving the patent and patent litigation systems," which
includes not only further revised proposals for a Community Patent but
also discussions on the EPLA. 4 0 1 As MEP Sharon Bowles remarked, "In the
391. EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE PATENT SYSTEM IN EUROPE (2006),

http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/indprop/docs/patent/consult-en.pdf. The consultation focused on four major areas: the basic principles of the patent system, the Community Patent, the EPLA, and the mutual recognition of national patents. Grazyna
Piesiewicz, Stakeholders Debate Future Policy on Patents, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, July

2006, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/smn/smn42/docs/patents-en.pdf.
392. See Closing Remarks, supra note 383; Next Steps, supra note 29 ("The level of
participation in the consultation exercise exceeded my most optimistic expectations.").
393. Next Steps, supra note 29.
394. Id.; FUTURE PATENT POLICY, supra note 377, at 4,5; see Closing Remarks, supra

note 383.
395. Closing Remarks, supra note 383; Piesiewicz, supra note 391, at 1.
396. See Next Steps, supra note 29; Piesiewicz, supra note 391, at 2.
397. See Piesiewicz, supra note 391, at 2.
398. Next Steps, supra note 29.
399. Id.
400. See id; Intellectual Property: Mixed Reactions to Patent Resolution, EUR. REP. (European Info. Serv., London), Oct. 16, 2006 [hereinafter Mixed Reactions]. There were 494

votes for the joint resolution, 109 against, and 18 abstentions.
401. Mixed Reactions, supra note 400.
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Parliament, we all wish to see a Community Patent in place eventually
rather than a system based on a different multi-national convention. But
the Community Patent proposals as they stand now are hopelessly
stuck."40 2 In regard to the EPLA, the MEPs called for greater democratic
control, increased judicial independence, more guarantees on litigation
costs, and a proposal for the EPLA court's rules of procedure. 40 3 Although
the European Community postponed its self-imposed 2006 end-of-year
deadline for presenting a communication on European patent strategy
because member states could not agree on the proposal, 40 4 given
McGreevy's and the European Parliament's recent statements and efforts,
there is good reason for optimism in regard to future improvements in the
4
European patent litigation system.

III.
A.

05

Lessons from Europe
Continued Territoriality Reinforces Comity Concerns

After Interlas, advocates of the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign patent claims in U.S. courts bemoaned the "parochial"40 6 attitude of the
United States toward multinational patent enforcement in comparison to
European courts, specifically the Dutch. 40 7 Because multinational patent
enforcement was "garden variety" in many European countries, advocates
dismissed as "completely absurd" the concerns that assertion of jurisdiction over foreign patents in U.S. courts would undermine principles of
international comity. '' 40 8

Relying heavily on the "Dutch[-]inspired move-

' 40 9
ment toward a compellingly different world patent enforcement regime,
these advocates argued that the United States should recognize and accelerate global trends toward multinational patent enforcement in national
4 10

courts.

402. Id.
403. Id.
404. See European Patent: Towards a Watered-Down Patent?,EUR. REP. (European Info.
Serv., London), Nov. 23, 2006; Intellectual Property: A Patent Failure, EUR. REP. (European Info. Serv., London), Dec. 8, 2006; Patents: All-English Patents Seen Looming, supra
note 366.
405. Certainly, such improvements cannot be expected soon. As President of the
EPO, Alain Pompidou, admits, even if the problems with the agreements were solved
immediately, it would take approximately five to eight years for the court system to be
established. See Patents: All-English Patents Seen Looming, supra note 404.
406. Thomas, supra note 1, at 280.
407. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 1, at 280, 346, 352 (asserting that, in accepting
jurisdiction over foreign patents, U.S. courts would be following the Dutch movement
toward international patent enforcement); Wegner, supra note 18, at 3, 12-15 (arguing
that the conservative American approach to transnational enforcement has left the
United States behind Europe and Japan, who are both leaders in the area).
408. Wegner, supra note 18, at 10, 12, 15-17; see Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 14.
409. Thomas, supra note 1, at 346.
410. Id. at 346; Wegner, supra note 18, at 12; see Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 12;
Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 47-49. Advocates pointed out that foreign national
courts' greater amenability to foreign patent claims put U.S. industry, without the ability
to rely on its own courts for consolidated patent claims, at a comparative disadvantage.
Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 12.
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The July 13, 2006 ECJ decisions in Roche and GAT, decided while the
Voda decision was pending in the Federal Circuit, however, largely halted
the European multinational patent enforcement trend, emphasizing the
continued territoriality of patent law despite continued efforts to the contrary. 4 1 ' In so doing, the ECJ eliminated such arguments, forcefully
presented in the Voda briefs supporting consolidation and scholarly literature, which pointed to European case law to belittle international comity4 1 2 and encouraged U.S. courts to follow European trends toward
multinational patent enforcement. 4 13 In contrast to these arguments,
recent European trends counsel against widespread multinational patent
enforcement in national courts. Thus, in Voda, the Federal Circuit, emphasizing comity considerations, wisely followed the example of the ECJ in
further limiting the opportunity for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign patent claims.

4 14

The ECJ decisions in Roche and GAT emphasize that patents remain
national instruments, disputes over which are usually appropriate for the
national courts of the granting nation, especially when validity is in dispute. 4 15 The ECJ's re-emphasis on the territoriality of European patent law
is of particular importance because Europe led the way in multinational
patent enforcement. 4 1 6 Significantly, the ECJ itself exists to defend the
harmonization of European legal standards and has worked in this direction on the basis of conventions meant to overcome the traditional concept
that each nation is individually responsible for its own legal standards and
the assertion and enforcement of rights in its territory. 41 7 Furthermore,
the basic principles of the EU, a cooperative association of European
states, clash with the concept of limited patent enforceability, 4 18 leading to
the increasing harmonization and unification of European patent laws
through agreements such as the EPC. 4 19 Additionally, within the EU, the
Brussels Convention requires all contracting states to recognize and
411. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
412. See Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 14; Wegner, supra note 18, at 10, 12,
15-17.
413. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 19, at 47-49; Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at
12-14; Thomas, supra note 1, at 346; Wegner, supra note 18, at 12, 15-17, 122.
414. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900-03 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Takenaka,
supra note 24.
415. See Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen
und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6509, para. 22 ("ITIhe exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents conferred
upon the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been
applied for or made is justified by the fact that those courts are best placed to adjudicate
upon cases in which the dispute itself concerns the validity of the patent or the existence
of the deposit or registration."); Barraclough, supra note 276; Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
416. See Wegner, supra note 18, at 12.
417. Schuster, supra note 35.
418. Bender, supra note 3, at 49.
419. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19; Piotraut, supra note 11, at 61-62. In addition to creating a European patent, the EPC established uniform provisions for determining the validity and scope of European patents that are binding on national judges.
Schuster, supra note 35.
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enforce the judgments of other contracting states' courts that are rendered
within the parameters of the Convention. 4 20 Despite these factors, which
make European courts, especially those of EU member states, a much more
ideal venue for multinational patent enforcement than those of the United
States, 4 2 1 the ECJ largely quelled the possibility for multinational patent
enforcement, 4 22 displaying an undeniable "mistrust for the Dutch
approach" to multinational patent enforcement. 4 23 At a minimum, the ECJ
decisions reinforced the "international consensus" that courts of one sovereign nation cannot rule on the validity of another nation's patents. 4 24 The
broader implication, however, is that, in the large majority of circumstances, national courts are not an appropriate forum for multinational
patent enforcement, 4 25 even within countries that have similar patent
laws 4 26 and agreements to recognize and enforce national courts'
42 7
judgments.
Despite both the Community Patent and EPLA's goal of unifying the
European patent system beyond national borders, the initiatives provide
further evidence of European nations' general refusal to allow a foreign
national court to determine the validity of patents effective in their territory. In Community Patent negotiations, the problems concerning the
competence to invalidate a Community patent exhibit this hesitance, 42 8 as
contracting states would not accept a foreign national court's invalidation
of a Community patent, an instrument which, given the proposed common
granting system, would have less territorial attachment to the sovereign
nation than a national patent granted in a national patent office. 4 29 Specif-

ically, in the original CPC plans, member states had the authority to grant
their national courts the competence to determine the validity of a Community patent only in the context of a counterclaim to an infringement
action and, furthermore, such a determination would only be binding on
that particular state. 430 Moreover, the revised 1989 Agreement gave
national courts the competence to decide invalidity in the first instance,
but because the states would not accept a foreign national court's invalidation of a Community patent, the validity decisions of national courts could
be appealed to a CoPAC. 4 3 1 The insistence on an appellate court to review
420. See Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 426.
421. See Rasser, supra note 36 ("As the United States is not a member of anything that
even approaches the EU in terms of level of cooperation, one might not expect the issue"
of jurisdiction over the alleged infringement of a foreign patent "to play much of a role in
U[.]S[.1 court practice.").
422. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 1.
423. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 351.
424. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 33.
425. Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
426. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 19; Piotraut, supra note 11, at 61-62.
427. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 34; Thomas, supra note 1, at
301-02.
428. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 27.
429. Schalkwijk, supra note 318.
430. Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 27.
431. Id.
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a national courts' determination on the validity of a Community patent
suggests that European nations are not prepared to accept a foreign
national court's invalidation of a patent effective in their country. In contrast to their refusal to allow foreign national courts to judge patent invalidity, the most recent agreements for both the Community Patent and the
EPLA show that European nations are more receptive to allowing a common multinational patent court or judicial system to adjudicate patents
valid in their territory. 43 2 Thus, although the current network of patent
treaties shows that European nations appreciate that they must work
together to ensure patent protection for their own inventors, 433 European
nations undeniably remain hesitant to permit other national courts to
adjudicate their own patents.
European nations' reluctance to allow foreign national courts to adjudicate their patents confirms that international comity concerns undoubtedly linger when one national court asserts jurisdiction over a foreign
country's patent, suggesting the wisdom of Federal Circuit's hesitance to
permit U.S. courts to assume jurisdiction over foreign patent claims, particularly on account of comity concerns. 43 4 "As long as the force of a patent
instrument remains tied to territorial boundaries," 435 comity considerations, which continue to be the main obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign patent claims in U.S. case law, 4 36 are inevitable in an extraterritorial patent adjudication. 43 7 As such, European developments seem to
serve as a clear warning to U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
patents in very limited circumstances to avoid offending other nations'
sovereignty.
B.

The Current Realities of Multinational Patent Enforcement in
National Courts

In Europe, the ECJ's decisions basically eliminate the possibility of
multinational patent enforcement for EU nations. 4 38 It is true that the ECJ
did leave a window of opportunity for multinational patent enforcement
where a patentee sues a single defendant in its country of domicile and the
defendant does not challenge patent validity.4 3 9 The reality, however, is
432. See Press Release, supra note 343; EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at
5-6. In the EPLA, national courts must retain authority over infringement and revocation actions concerning national patents, but participating nations can transfer jurisdiction over European patents granted by the EPO to the common European Patent Court.
See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5-6. In the latest Community Patent
proposal, the Community Patent Court would have jurisdiction over Community patents, but national courts would retain jurisdiction over national patents and European
patents. Press Release, supra note 343.
433. Thomas, supra note 1, at 325-26.
434. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900-03 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Mars II, 24
F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
435. Thomas, supra note 1, at 340.
436. See Rader, supra note 14, at 6.
437. Thomas, supra note 1, at 340.
438. See MacKendrick, supra note 281, at 373.
439. See Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2.
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that such circumstances are bound to occur rarely, if ever. 4 40 Although the
full scope of the decisions, 44 ' as well as the impact of the litigation on nonEU member states, remains to be seen, 4 4 2 the ECJ decisions have undoubtedly largely limited the occurrence of multinational patent litigation in
European countries.

4 43

Similarly, in the United States, the Federal Circuit's decisions in Voda
and Mars, which perpetuate U.S. courts' historically conservative approach
to jurisdiction over foreign patent claims, 44 4 have all but eliminated the
possibility of a U.S. court exercising such jurisdiction. 4 45 Both decisions
emphasize comity concerns, 44 6 which have been the most significant barrier to jurisdiction over foreign patent claims in U.S. case law. 4 47 Given

that the facts of Voda presented a minimal risk of offending a foreign sovereign, the decision likely indicates that comity concerns remove the possibility of a U.S. court assuming jurisdiction over foreign patent claims in the
vast majority of cases. 448 With regard to supplemental jurisdiction over

foreign patent claims, Mars and Voda set high standards for both prongs of
the § 1367 analysis. Certainly, Mars' strict § 1367(a) analysis for the existence of supplemental jurisdiction 4 4 9 and Voda's limitation on judicial discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under §1367(c)

4 50

make it

highly unlikely that a foreign patent claim would pass both prongs of the
analysis. Moreover, the strict application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in the Mars dicta largely forecloses the possibility of a U.S. court
assuming jurisdiction over a foreign patent claim based on diversity jurisdiction. 45 1 Thus, current U.S. case law emphasizes that only a rare foreign
patent claim would survive a U.S. court's discretion not to exercise juris440. See Klinkert et al., supra note 281; Shaw, supra note 26, at 2. See supra Part IL.B
pp. 133-34 for a more thorough discussion of the rare situations in which multinational
patent enforcement is still permissible in the national courts of EU members after the
ECJ decisions.
441. See MacKendrick, supra note 281, at 373 (noting that the President of the District Court of The Hague held in a September 21, 2006 verdict that GAT does not affect
cross-border injunctions in summary proceedings and granted a cross-border injunction
for Germany).
442. See Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 12 n.9.
443. Schuster, supra note 35.
444. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 900-03 (Fed. Cir. 2007); MARS II, 24
F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Chisum, supra note 18, at 610; Wegner, supra note 18,
at 12-15.
445. See Chisum, supra note 18, at 613; Takenaka, supra note 24.
446. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 900-03; Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1376.
447. Rader, supra note 14, at 6.
448. Igielski, supra note 121. See supra pp. 543-44 for a discussion of the strong
argument for supplemental jurisdiction in Voda.
449. See Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375; Chisum, supra note 18, at 613. See supra pp.
533-34 for a discussion of the Mars § 1367(a) analysis.
450. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 909 (Newman,J., dissenting); Adams, supra note 143; Igielski, supra note 121. See supra pp. 539-541 for a discussion of the Voda § 1367(c)
analysis.
451. See Mars II, 24 F.3d at 1375-76; Chisum, supra note 18, at 613; Thomas, supra
note 1, at 324; Wegner, supra note 18, at 27. See supra p. 535 for a discussion of the
Mars dicta.
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diction based on forum non conveniens, comity concerns, and, for supple452
mental jurisdiction cases, the § 1367(c) discretionary analysis.
In addition to its rare permissibility, the realities of multinational patent litigation in national courts prevent it from being an ideal solution to
patentees' problems. 4 53 Even in Europe where numerous agreements have
harmonized national patent law and provide for enforcement and recognition of national court decisions, 45 4 suits for multinational patent enforcement in one national court often lead to unavoidable national validity or
anti-suit related follow-up or collateral proceedings in foreign national
courts.

45 5

As a result, even during its peak in Europe in the mid-1990s,

multinational patent litigation was never "the dominant model of choice"
for patentees confronted with infringement in various countries. 4 56 As the
Federal Circuit emphasized in Voda, for litigation in the United States, the
additional uncertainty of enforcing the decision abroad makes multinational patent litigation even more problematic. 4 57 Thus, the majority of
cases in European and U.S. courts will never qualify for consolidation and,
for those that do, the difficulties involved risk increased costs, delay, and
uncertainty on account of parallel or collateral proceedings. 4 58 As a result,
consolidation of foreign patent claims will currently only prove to be expe4 59
dient in a very small number of cases.
C.

The Best Way Forward

The current realities of multinational patent enforcement in national
courts illustrate that it is, at best, an "intermediate solution[ ],,460 on the
path toward an integrated international patent enforcement system.
Although there are undeniable benefits to the global litigation of patents,
the current system of international treaties is not sufficiently developed to
allow for the effective adjudication of foreign patents in national courts in
most situations. 46 1 An integral solution for piecemeal patent litigation on
a nation-by-nation basis ultimately depends on a "much more long term
and focused global plan of international treaties and conventions .... -462
The ECJ's decisions in Roche and GAT, which curtail the multinational
patent enforcement trend in European national courts, as well as the Fed452. See Voda, 476 F.3d 887; Mars II, 24 F.3d 1368; Goldberg v. Cordis Corp., 203
U.S.P.Q. 717 (N.D. 111.1976), affd, 567 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1977); Packard Instrument
Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Il. 1972).
453. Schuster, supra note 35.
454. See Rasser, supra note 36; Schuster, supra note 35.
455. Schuster, supra note 35.
456. Id.
457. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 903; Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 9.
458. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 903; Schuster, supra note 35.
459. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 4.
460. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 119, at 560 (quoting Lois E. Boland, Future
Development of the PCT System: The View of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Address to the International Symposium on the PCT System in the 21st Century
(Apr. 15-17, 1998)).
461. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 898-900; Municoy, supra note 66, at 342.
462. Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 9.
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eral Circuit's decisions in Mars and Voda, which further restrict the possibility of multinational patent enforcement in U.S. courts, demonstrate the
necessity of an international patent enforcement system to overcome the
duplicative litigation currently required. 46 3 Moreover, subsequent to the
ECJ decisions, the increased emphasis on the EPLA, a common judicial
system for European patents, and the Community Patent initiative, which
encompasses not only a unified judicial system but also a unitary supranational patent, demonstrates the inevitability of such an international patent
system. 4 64 The European initiatives, which remain the only negotiations
toward an international procedure for patent enforcement, 4 65 are a prime
illustration of the difficulties involved in establishing an international patent system, as well as the likely steps along the way.
As the Federal Circuit noted in Voda, an international agreement providing for the mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would undoubtedly make multinational patent enforcement in national
courts a more practical solution by enabling the rendering court to make a
plaintiff whole in a single proceeding. 4 66 Such agreements exist on bilateral and regional bases, 46 7 but an international agreement, embracing a
more extensive network of countries, would provide for more effective multinational patent litigation. 46 8 Efforts in the 1990s toward such an agreement, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, a proposed
international agreement for the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil
and commercial matters modeled after the Brussels Convention, ultimately
failed. 46 9 However, the progress towards an agreement to improve multinational litigation offers "significant hope for the future" of multinational patent

enforcement in national courts.

4 70

Nevertheless,

the European

example of multinational patent enforcement in national courts on the
basis of the Brussels Convention suggests that general agreements to
respect and enforce the judgments of foreign national courts do not fully
streamline the multinational patent litigation process, because national
validity or anti-suit related follow-up proceedings are unavoidable. 4 7 1 In
light of the European experience, agreements providing for mutual recognition of judgments in national courts are likely insufficient to provide the
463. See Anneliese M. Seifert, Will the United States Take the Plunge into Global Patent
Law Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States' Past, Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 173 (2002); Igielski, supra note 121.
464. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 119, at 547, 560 ( "Will the [world patent
system] be in effect by the year 2099? Without a doubt!").
465. John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7J. INT'L EcON. L. 341, 349
(2004).
466. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 903; Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 424; Elmer & Garcia,
supra note 13, at 7.
467. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, supra note 257.
468. See Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 425.
469. Municoy, supra note 66, at 378-79.
470. Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 425-41 (analyzing an intellectual property case both
without and under the proposed Hague Convention to show the potential benefits to
"international litigation and to the sound administration of intellectual property law");
see Rader, supra note 14, at 7.
471. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 8; Schuster, supra note 35.
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"consistent and economically available system of judicial interpretation
and enforcement" 4 72 necessary for effective patent enforcement.
After the ECJ decisions, the recent push primarily for a more realistic
EPLA and, ultimately, for the ideal Community Patent suggests that Europe
has realized that the appropriate means to ensure effective, uniform multinational patent enforcement is a multinational agreement establishing a
common patent judicial system. 473 An international patent judicial system
or a single international patent court, on a global as opposed to a regional
European level, would create a more streamlined method of multinational
patent enforcement of national patents, 4 7 4 avoiding the collateral and parallel proceedings that prevent multinational patent enforcement in national
courts from functioning effectively. 47 5 A single international patent court,
similar to the CoPAC proposed in the 1989 Community Patent Agreement, 4 76 or, ideally, a fully integrated patent judicial system, similar to the

Community Patent Court envisaged in the 2003 Community Patent proposal or the European Patent Court planned in the EPLA,4 7 7 would ensure a
uniform, final decision on each litigated national patent, which is often
absent in present attempts at multinational patent enforcement in national
courts. 4 78

Additionally, uniform procedural rules of the international

court would assuage another problem with the multinational patent litigation in national courts, which plunges foreign litigants into an unfamiliar
system with often substantially different procedural laws. 4 7 9 Furthermore,
a detailed language regime would better anticipate the translational issues
4 80
likely to occur when a court adjudicates multiple national patents.
As illustrated in Europe's aspiration for the implementation of the
472. See Pauline Newman, On Global Patent Cooperation, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
& ENT. LJ. 3, 3 (1997).
473. See Closing Remarks, supra note 383; Next Steps, supra note 29.
474. Newman, supra note 472, at 3, 6.
475. See Elmer & Garcia, supra note 13, at 8; Schuster, supra note 35.
476. See DiCataldo, supra note 11, at 27.
477. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 15, at 5-6.
478. See Schuster, supra note 35. As the EPLA demonstrates, see Industrial Property,
supra note 379 and Innovation/IntellectualProperty, supra note 387, national sovereignty
and constitutional concerns would undoubtedly be an issue in the delegation of power
to an international body for patent enforcement. See Newman, supra note 472, at 7.
Although the constitutionality of such a patent court is beyond the scope of this article,
see David W. Okey, Constitutionality of a Multi-National Patent System, Part II, 81 J. Pat.
& Trademark Off. Soc'y 927, 939-49 (1999) and Seifert, supra note 463, at 202-03, for
an argument that an international patent court would not raise any constitutional issues
in the United States. Additionally, see Newman, supra note 472, at 6, for the suggestion
that, in order to avoid such national sovereignty concerns, a tribunal could be established in which nations do not yield their sovereignty, but rather citizens themselves
would yield to the tribunal.
479. See Chisum, supra note 18, at 614; Municoy, supra note 66, at 372. U.S. civil
procedure rules, which feature liberal discovery and the right to a jury trial, differ substantially from foreign procedural rules. Chisum, supra note 18, at 614. Such differences constitute a strong argument against the adjudication of foreign patent claims in
U.S. courts. Id.
480. See 2003 Commission Proposal, supra note 343, at 9; EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
supra note 15, at 6.
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Community Patent, 48 1 an ideal solution to multinational patent enforcement entails not only a common judicial system but also an international,
global patent. 4 82 A multinational organization, established by treaty, creat-

ing a global patent that is respected in all member states and enforced by
an international patent court would allow for the most uniform interpretation and enforcement of global patent rights. 48 3 Nevertheless, as the years

of negotiations in the Community Patent initiative clearly show, there are
48 4
many obstacles along the way to a truly international patent system.

Given the increased harmonization of European patent law on account of
the EPC, 48 5 the establishment of a global patent, which would require the
agreement of nations with more divergent patent laws, would likely be even
more problematic than the establishment of a Community Patent within
the EU. 4 86 Therefore, such a fully harmonized international patent system
complete with a global patent and international patent court is certainly
not likely in the short term, 48 7 but the obstacles do not appear to be insurmountable. 48 8 As now Director of the Office of International Relations for
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Lois E. Boland, stated,
At some point in the future, we will have an international patent system...
[in which] the right of an inventor will be universally recognized without
having to seek patent protection in each of the countries of the world. It is
likely that we will experience a number of intermediate solutions on the way
to this true 'global patent,'
but we have started down that path and we are
48 9
not likely to turn back.

Europe's example shows that progressive, intermediate steps toward effec490
tive multinational patent enforcement are on the horizon.
481. See 'Concerted Push'for European Patents, supra note 356 ("In an ideal world, the
Community Patent is the solution.").
482. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 119, at 547.
483. See id. (predicting that, "[tio be truly effective," the world patent system will
grant "a single, unitary patent respected in all of the member states").
484. See generallv Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 27-29 (explaining the difficulties
encountered in negotiations toward a Community Patent).
485. See id. at 27; Heath, supra note 317, at 17.
486. The implementation of a global patent entails a tremendous number of issues
related to patent prosecution beyond those relating to enforcement, including translation requirements upon issuance, the definition of patentable subject matter, whether to
require "best mode" disclosure, whether to require relevant prior art disclosure, postgrant procedures, claiming practice, and patent term extension. See Mossinghoff & Kuo,
supra note 119, at 554-56; Seifert, supra note 463, at 201.
487. See Municoy, supra note 66, at 404; Seifert, supra note 463, at 202.
488. See Di Cataldo, supra note 11, at 27 ("Immediately after its signing, the CPC
faced unsolvable non-strategic problems that have prevented its ratification and its
becoming effective. These problems are not per se insurmountable; rather they are
problems whose settlement has been prevented only by the sometimes, and all too often,
resurgent chauvinism of the European States."); Newman, supra note 472, at 7.
489. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 119, at 17 (quoting Lois E. Boland, Future
Development of the PCT System: The View of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Address to the International Symposium on the PCT System in the 21st Century
(Apr. 15-17, 1998)).
490. See Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 119, at 547.
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Conclusion
The historic territoriality of patent law fundamentally clashes with the
increasingly global technology that it seeks to protect. As a result, in order
to protect their inventions on an international level as required in today's
global marketplace, inventors are forced to pursue duplicative litigations on
a nation-by-nation basis. In response, advocates in both Europe and the
United States have called for multinational patent enforcement, which has
tremendous potential advantages over multiple suits in various national
courts. Beginning in 1989, Dutch courts led Europe in a multinational
patent enforcement trend, attacking the conventional territoriality of patent
rights. In contrast, mainly due to international comity concerns, U.S.
courts remain reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over foreign patent claims,
leading to a handful of futile attempts to litigate foreign patents in the
United States.
As the Federal Circuit's opinion on the issue awaited clarification in
Voda v. Cordis Corp., intervening ECJ decisions crushed the multinational
patent enforcement trend in European courts, leading to an increased
emphasis on both the Community Patent and the EPLA in an attempt to
unify the disjointed European patent litigation system. The ECJ decisions,
which largely destroy the potential for multinational patent enforcement in
European national courts, as well as the proposed judicial systems in the
Community Patent initiative and the EPLA, demonstrate European nations'
continued hesitance to allow foreign national courts to adjudicate patents
effective in their territory and, thus, reinforce the logic of U.S. courts that
have refused to exercise jurisdiction over foreign patent claims. Furthermore, the inefficiencies evident in past multinational patent enforcement
efforts in European national courts establish that unavoidable parallel and
collateral proceedings in foreign national courts result in substantial
expense, delay, and uncertainty for litigants. As a result of these difficulties and the recent ECJ decisions, the drive for both the more-readily-attainable EPLA and the ideal Community Patent show that Europe has realized
that multinational agreements to establish a common patent judicial system are the appropriate means to ensure uniform, efficient multinational
patent enforcement. Thus, as past and present European initiatives illustrate, multinational patent enforcement in national courts is only an intermediate solution in the long and difficult path toward the effective
protection of international patent rights.

